Incorrect access control in Aternity agent in Riverbed Aternity before 12.1.4.27 allows for local privilege escalation. There is an insufficiently protected handle to the A180AG.exe SYSTEM process with PROCESSALLACCESS rights.

Multiple cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities in the web server in Aternity before 9.0.1 allow remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the (1) HTTPAgent, (2) MacAgent, (3) getExternalURL, or (4) retrieveTrustedUrl page.

The web server in Aternity before 9.0.1 does not require authentication for getMBeansFromURL loading of Java MBeans, which allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary Java code by registering MBeans.

SteelCentral Aternity Agent 11.0.0.120 on Windows mishandles IPC. It uses an executable running as a high privileged Windows service to perform administrative tasks and collect data from other processes. It distributes functionality among different processes and uses IPC (Inter-Process Communication) primitives to enable the processes to cooperate. Any user in the system is allowed to access the interprocess communication channel AternityAgentAssistantIpc, retrieve a serialized object and call object methods remotely. Among others, the methods allow any user to: (1) Create and/or overwrite arbitrary XML files across the system; (2) Create arbitrary directories across the system; and (3) Load arbitrary plugins (i.e., C# assemblies) from the "%PROGRAMFILES(X86)/Aternity Information Systems/Assistant/plugins” directory and execute code contained in them.

SteelCentral Aternity Agent before 11.0.0.120 on Windows allows Privilege Escalation via a crafted file. It uses an executable running as a high privileged Windows service to perform administrative tasks and collect data from other processes. It distributes functionality among different processes and uses IPC (Inter-Process Communication) primitives to enable the processes to cooperate. The remotely callable methods from remotable objects available through interprocess communication allow loading of arbitrary plugins (i.e., C# assemblies) from the "%PROGRAMFILES(X86)%/Aternity Information Systems/Assistant/plugins” directory, where the name of the plugin is passed as part of an XML-serialized object. However, because the name of the DLL is concatenated with the “.\plugins” string, a directory traversal vulnerability exists in the way plugins are resolved.