Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
8.5
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L

During an annual penetration test conducted on behalf of Axis Communication, Truesec discovered a flaw in the ACAP Application framework that allowed applications to access restricted D-Bus methods within the framework. Axis has released patched AXIS OS versions for the highlighted flaw. Please refer to the Axis security advisory for more information and solution.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.8
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

During an annual penetration test conducted on behalf of Axis Communication, Truesec discovered a flaw in the VAPIX Device Configuration framework that could lead to an incorrect user privilege level in the VAPIX service account D-Bus API.

First published (updated )
Severity
3.8
Input Validation, Command Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

Erik de Jong, member of the AXIS OS Bug Bounty Program, has found that the VAPIX API ftptest.cgi did not have a sufficient input validation allowing for a possible command injection leading to being able to transfer files from/to the Axis device. This flaw can only be exploited after authenticating with an administrator-privileged service account. Axis has released patched AXIS OS versions for the highlighted flaw. Please refer to the Axis security advisory for more information and solution.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.1
Malicious File Upload, Input Validation, Command Injection
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N

Girishunawane, member of the AXIS OS Bug Bounty Program, has found that the VAPIX API dynamicoverlay.cgi did not have a sufficient input validation allowing for a possible command injection leading to being able to transfer files to the Axis device with the purpose to exhaust system resources. Axis has released patched AXIS OS versions for the highlighted flaw. Please refer to the Axis security advisory for more information and solution.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.4
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L

The VAPIX Device Configuration framework allowed a privilege escalation, enabling a lower-privileged user to gain administrator privileges.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
EPSS
0.04%
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Amin Aliakbari, member of the AXIS OS Bug Bounty Program, has found a broken access control which would lead to less-privileged operator- and/or viewer accounts having more privileges than designed. The risk of exploitation is very low as it requires complex steps to execute, including knowing of account passwords and social engineering attacks in tricking the administrator to perform specific configurations on operator- and/or viewer-privileged accounts. Axis has released patched AXIS OS a version for the highlighted flaw. Please refer to the Axis security advisory for more information and solution.

First published (updated )
Severity
4.3
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

51l3nc3, a member of the AXIS OS Bug Bounty Program, has found that the VAPIX API uploadoverlayimage.cgi did not have sufficient input validation to allow an attacker to upload files to block access to create image overlays in the web interface of the Axis device.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

During an annual penetration test conducted on behalf of Axis Communications, Truesec discovered a flaw in the VAPIX Device Configuration framework that allowed for unauthenticated username enumeration through the VAPIX Device Configuration SSH Management API.

First published (updated )

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