BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.4.3, an out-of-bounds read vulnerability in bacnet-stack's WritePropertyMultiple service decoder allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read past allocated buffer boundaries by sending a truncated WPM request. The vulnerability stems from wpmdecodeobjectproperty() calling the deprecated decodetagnumberandvalue() function, which performs no bounds checking on the input buffer. A crafted BACnet/IP packet with a truncated property payload causes the decoder to read 1-7 bytes past the end of the buffer, leading to crashes or information disclosure on embedded BACnet devices. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.3.

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.4.3, an off-by-one out-of-bounds read vulnerability in bacnet-stack's ReadPropertyMultiple service decoder allows unauthenticated remote attackers to read one byte past an allocated buffer boundary by sending a crafted RPM request with a truncated object identifier. The vulnerability is in rpmdecodeobjectid(), which checks apdulen < 5 but then accesses all 6 byte positions (indices 0-5) — consuming 1 byte for the context tag, 4 bytes for the object ID, then reading apdu[5] for the opening tag check. A 5-byte input passes the length check but causes a 1-byte OOB read, leading to crashes on embedded BACnet devices. The vulnerability exists in src/bacnet/rpm.c and affects any deployment that enables the ReadPropertyMultiple confirmed service handler (enabled by default in the reference server). This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.3.

BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to 1.5.0rc4 and 1.4.3rc2, a malformed WriteProperty request can trigger a length underflow in the BACnet stack, leading to an out‑of‑bounds read and a crash (DoS). The issue is in wp.c within wpdecodeservicerequest. When decoding the optional priority context tag, the code passes apdulen - apdusize to bacnetunsignedcontextdecode without validating that apdusize <= apdulen. If a truncated APDU reaches this path, apdulen - apdusize underflows, resulting in a large size being used for decoding and an out‑of‑bounds read. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.5.0rc4 and 1.4.3rc2.