Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated path traversal exfiltrates local files through auto-reply attachments in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - Balbooa Forms accepts upload-field state as Guest-controlled JSON during public form submission. For every object whose id merely looks numeric, the component trusts the supplied filename, concatenates it below the configured upload directory, and adds the result to an array of local attachment paths. It does not load the referenced attachment row, verify ownership/session/form/field, require that the ID exists, canonicalize the path, or enforce containment. If the form's normal “auto reply” and “attach uploaded files” options are enabled, the component sends those local paths as email attachments to the address submitted in an email field. A Guest can therefore submit a nonexistent numeric ID plus a traversal filename such as ../../../../configuration.php and receive any file readable by the Joomla process.

Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated RCE via field shortcode injection in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - Balbooa Forms supports administrator-defined PHP code which runs after a public form submission. The feature also supports form-field shortcodes inside that PHP. Before calling eval(), the component replaces each shortcode with the raw value submitted by the visitor, leading to an RCE vector. A public form must use the product's optional PHP-after-submission action and interpolate an attacker-controlled field shortcode inside a double-quoted PHP string to be vulnerable.

Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - File meta data tampering in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - The final form submission processes JSON arrays per upload field, checking only that IDs are numeric. Client-supplied filenames and display names are trusted directly, introducing potential cross-session claiming, metadata tampering, and path traversal risks (e.g., via getFilePath())

Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthorized Deletion of Attachments in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - The public removeTmpAttachment action accepts an integer attachment ID and deletes the matching database row and file. The controller verifies a Joomla session token, but the model does not bind that ID to the session that uploaded the file, the current user, the form, the upload field, or the temporary state. Any guest can obtain a token for their own session, so the token prevents CSRF but does not authorize the target object.

Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated upload filename stored XSS in Balbooa Forms < 2.4.3.4 - The public form upload endpoint validates the uploaded file's extension and detected MIME type, but stores the attacker-supplied original multipart filename verbatim in #baformssubmissionsattachments.name. A later anonymous form submission associates that temporary attachment with the newly created submission. When an administrator opens the submission, the component's JavaScript retrieves the stored attachment record and concatenates file.name directly into an HTML string. The complete string is assigned to innerHTML.

Balbooa Forms contains an unrestricted upload of file with dangerous type vulnerability that allows an unauthenticated arbitrary file upload which could allow uploading of executable files leading to full RCE.