Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Beckhoff Embedded Windows PLCs through 3.1.4024.0, and Beckhoff Twincat on Windows Engineering stations, allow an attacker to achieve Remote Code Execution (as SYSTEM) via the Beckhoff ADS protocol.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.4
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Beckhoff Embedded PC images before 2014-10-22 and Automation Device Specification (ADS) TwinCAT components might allow remote attackers to obtain access via the (1) Windows CE Remote Configuration Tool, (2) CE Remote Display service, or (3) TELNET service.

Remedy

Beckhoff recommends in their IPC Security Manual ( https://download.beckhoff.com/download/Document/ipc/industrial-pc/ipc_security_en.pdf ) to use network and software firewalls to block all network ports except the ones that are needed. Beckhoff also recommends that default passwords be changed during commissioning before connecting systems to the network. In their advisories (Advisory 2014-001: Potential misuse of several administrative services, https://download.beckhoff.com/download/document/product-security/Advisories/advisory-2014-001.pdf . Advisory 2014-002: ADS communication port allows password bruteforce, https://download.beckhoff.com/download/document/product-security/Advisories/advisory-2014-002.pdf . Advisory2014-003: Recommendation to change default passwords, https://download.beckhoff.com/download/document/product-security/Advisories/advisory-2014-003.pdf  which were published November 17, 2014) for these issues, Beckhoff also recommends the following mitigation solutions: * Update images to build October 22, 2014, or newer, which solve these problems by disabling the services by default. * Disable the Windows CE Remote Configuration Tool by deleting the subtree “/remoteadmin.” The configuration of the web server paths can be found in the Windows registry at the path “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\COMM\HTTPD\VROOTS\.” * Disable startup of CE Remote Display service (cerdisp.exe) with deleting the registry key containing the “CeRDisp.exe” [-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\init\Launch90]. * Disable telnet by setting the registry key [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Services\TELNETD\Flags] to dword: 4 * Restrict ADS communication to trusted networks only.
First published (updated )
Severity
9.4
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Beckhoff Embedded PC images before 2014-10-22 and Automation Device Specification (ADS) TwinCAT components do not restrict the number of authentication attempts, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain access via a brute-force attack.

Remedy

Beckhoff recommends in their IPC Security Manual ( https://download.beckhoff.com/download/Document/ipc/industrial-pc/ipc_security_en.pdf ) to use network and software firewalls to block all network ports except the ones that are needed. Beckhoff also recommends that default passwords be changed during commissioning before connecting systems to the network. In their advisories (Advisory 2014-001: Potential misuse of several administrative services, https://download.beckhoff.com/download/document/product-security/Advisories/advisory-2014-001.pdf . Advisory 2014-002: ADS communication port allows password bruteforce, https://download.beckhoff.com/download/document/product-security/Advisories/advisory-2014-002.pdf . Advisory2014-003: Recommendation to change default passwords, https://download.beckhoff.com/download/document/product-security/Advisories/advisory-2014-003.pdf  which were published November 17, 2014) for these issues, Beckhoff also recommends the following mitigation solutions: * Update images to build October 22, 2014, or newer, which solve these problems by disabling the services by default. * Disable the Windows CE Remote Configuration Tool by deleting the subtree “/remoteadmin.” The configuration of the web server paths can be found in the Windows registry at the path “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\COMM\HTTPD\VROOTS\.” * Disable startup of CE Remote Display service (cerdisp.exe) with deleting the registry key containing the “CeRDisp.exe” [-HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\init\Launch90]. * Disable telnet by setting the registry key [HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\Services\TELNETD\Flags] to dword: 4 * Restrict ADS communication to trusted networks only.
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
Weak Encryption
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Beckhoff TwinCAT supports communication over ADS. ADS is a protocol for industrial automation in protected environments. ADS has not been designed to achieve security purposes and therefore does not include any encryption algorithms because of their negative effect on performance and throughput. An attacker can forge arbitrary ADS packets when legitimate ADS traffic is observable.

First published (updated )
Severity
7.5
Divide by Zero
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

When Beckhoff TwinCAT is configured to use the Profinet driver, a denial of service of the controller could be reached by sending a malformed UDP packet to the device. This issue affects TwinCAT 2 version 2304 (and prior) and TwinCAT 3.1 version 4204.0 (and prior).

First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Beckhoff's TwinCAT RT network driver for Intel 8254x and 8255x is providing EtherCAT functionality. The driver implements real-time features. Except for Ethernet frames sent from real-time functionality, all other Ethernet frames sent through the driver are not padded if their payload is less than the minimum Ethernet frame size. Instead, arbitrary memory content is transmitted within in the padding bytes of the frame. Most likely this memory contains slices from previously transmitted or received frames. By this method, memory content is disclosed, however, an attacker can hardly control which memory content is affected. For example, the disclosure can be provoked with small sized ICMP echo requests sent to the device.

First published (updated )
Severity
5
Buffer Overflow
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:N/A:P

Beckhoff TwinCAT 2.11.0.2004 and earlier allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via a crafted request to UDP port 48899, which triggers an out-of-bounds read.

First published (updated )

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203