https://www.bouncycastle.org/resources/new-release-bouncy-castle-java-1-85/ announces the July 28 release of Bouncy Castle Java 1.85, "bringing significant advances in post-quantum cryptography, PKI migration, electronic signatures, secure messaging, and blockchain support."

It also says the release contains fixes for the following CVEs:

CVE-2026-8763 - Name Constraints bypass via trailing dot in rfc822Name and URI. CVE-2026-12185 - BKS/UBER keystore allocates from untrusted lengths before integrity check. CVE-2026-12802 - CMS AuthEnvelopedData fails to enforce tag-length on decryption. CVE-2026-12803 - KCCMBlockCipher MAC does not bind nonce when AAD is absent (cross-nonce AEAD forgery). CVE-2026-12816 - IESEngine stream-mode MAC forgery via length-dependent KDF split. CVE-2026-12817 - OpenPGP AEAD decryption skips final tag on chunk-aligned data. CVE-2026-12852 - MLS wire decoder allocates attacker-declared opaque length before bounds check. CVE-2026-12860 - RSA PKCS#1 verification skips last two hash bytes in NULL-omitted path. CVE-2026-13506 - Lazy ASN.1 sequence forcing resets nesting-depth guard. CVE-2026-13586 - PKCS#12 MAC and bag-decryption KDF iteration-count bound (DoS). CVE-2026-14682 - Possible OOM from unbounded up-front allocation on a definite-length read. CVE-2026-15055 - PKCS#8 / PBES2 decryptors honour unbounded KDF cost from input. CVE-2026-58059 - Quadratic-time escaping when stringifying X.500 distinguished names. CVE-2026-58060 - HSS public-key level count unbounded, enabling huge allocation on verify. CVE-2026-58061 - CCM-family modes write plaintext to caller buffer before tag check. CVE-2026-58062 - Stapled OCSP response accepted without binding to the checked certificate. CVE-2026-58063 - BCFKS keystore load honours unbounded KDF cost from untrusted file. CVE-2026-59638 - JSSE hostname verifier CN-fallback enabled by default despite documented opt-in. CVE-2026-59639 - CMS verifySignatures returns true for SignedData with zero signers. CVE-2026-59640 - OpenPGP CFB quick-check oracle active on symmetric/session-key paths. CVE-2026-59641 - S/MIME validator trusts signer-asserted signingTime for path validation. CVE-2026-59642 - CMS AuthenticatedData content not bound to MAC when authAttrs present. CVE-2026-59643 - OpenPGP inline-signature policy failures silently ignored. CVE-2026-59644 - MLS hash-ratchet honours arbitrary 32-bit generation counter from sender. CVE-2026-59645 - OER parser recurses without depth limit on self-referential IEEE 1609.2 schema. CVE-2026-59646 - DTLS handshake reassembler allocates buffer from unchecked 24-bit length. CVE-2026-59647 - CRMF/CMP password-MAC honours unbounded iteration count. CVE-2026-59648 - OpenPGP Argon2 S2K honours attacker-chosen memory and passes. CVE-2026-59649 - OpenPGP user-attribute subpacket length bounded only by JVM max memory. CVE-2026-59650 - MTI/A0 DH agreement exponentiates unvalidated peer value. CVE-2026-59651 - BKS keystore accepts legacy version with 16-bit integrity MAC key. CVE-2026-59652 - LDAP filter injection in legacy jdk1.4 LDAPStoreHelper.

I had the same thought so I asked the project owner and he shared the story :-)

https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/discussions/2388

Am Mi., 5. Aug. 2026 um 05:24 Uhr schrieb Alan Coopersmith < alan.coopersmith () oracle com>: On 8/3/2026 7:37 PM, Peter Gutmann wrote: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith () oracle com> writes: It also says the release contains fixes for the following CVEs: Given the quantity and sweeping scope of those, was this the result of some new tool used for code analysis? I'm assuming AI, it sounds like there'd be an interesting backstory to how all of this was turned up. I didn't see anything in the announcements from the Bouncy Castle folks about that.

They do have more info about the CVE's in their wiki, such as: https://github.com/bcgit/bc-java/wiki/CVE%E2%80%902026%E2%80%908763 but I don't see any reference there to how they were found/reported.