Capgo (Cap-go/capgo.app) contains an authentication bypass affecting all versions (no patched version available at time of publication). The Edge authorization path allows a password-only Supabase aal1 session to exercise privileged RBAC permissions even when the account has a verified MFA factor that has not been used for the session: the Edge JWT middleware (foundJWT() in supabase/functions/backend/utils/honomiddleware.ts) accepts the JWT without validating its assurance level, and the direct RBAC path (checkPermission()/checkPermissionPg() in supabase/functions/backend/utils/rbac.ts calling public.rbaccheckpermissiondirect()) authorizes by user ID without passing or checking the session aal, unlike the public.verifymfa() control which correctly requires aal2. An attacker who knows only the victim's password can therefore authenticate, mint a persistent app-scoped appadmin API key that remains valid after the aal1 session is logged out, and perform privileged operations such as modifying production OTA channel configurations (validated by changing a public production channel from bundle 1.0.0 to 1.0.1), defeating the protection provided by MFA.