In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: fix possible deadlock when holding Fwb to get inlinedata

1, mount with wsync. 2, create a file with ORDWR, and the request was sent to mds.0:

cephatomicopen()--> cephmdscdorequest(openc) finishopen(file, dentry, cephopen)--> cephopen()--> cephinitfile()--> cephinitfileinfo()--> cephuninlinedata()--> { ... if (inlineversion == 1 || / initial version, no data / inlineversion == CEPHINLINENONE) goto outunlock; ... }

The inlineversion will be 1, which is the initial version for the new create file. And here the ci->iinlineversion will keep with 1, it's buggy.

3, buffer write to the file immediately:

cephwriteiter()--> cephgetcaps(file, need=Fw, want=Fb, ...); genericperformwrite()--> aops->writebegin()--> cephwritebegin()--> netfswritebegin()--> netfsbeginread()--> netfsrreqsubmitslice()--> netfsreadfromserver()--> rreq->netfsops->issueread()--> cephnetfsissueread()--> { ... if (ci->iinlineversion != CEPHINLINENONE && cephnetfsissueopinline(subreq)) return; ... } cephputcaprefs(ci, Fwb);

The cephnetfsissueopinline() will send a getattr(Fsr) request to mds.1.

4, then the mds.1 will request the rd lock for CInode::filelock from the auth mds.0, the mds.0 will do the CInode::filelock state transation from excl --> sync, but it need to revoke the Fxwb caps back from the clients.

While the kernel client has aleady held the Fwb caps and waiting for the getattr(Fsr).

It's deadlock!

URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55377

A flaw was found in the way the Ceph RGW Beast front-end handles unexpected disconnects. An authenticated attacker can abuse this flaw by making multiple disconnect attempts resulting in a permanent leak of a socket connection by radosgw. This flaw could lead to a denial of service condition by pile up of CLOSEWAIT sockets, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources, preventing legitimate users from connecting to the system.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ceph: avoid kernel BUG for encrypted inode with unaligned file size

The generic/397 test hits a BUGON for the case of encrypted inode with unaligned file size (for example, 33K or 1K):

[ 877.737811] run fstests generic/397 at 2025-01-03 12:34:40 [ 877.875761] libceph: mon0 (2)127.0.0.1:40674 session established [ 877.876130] libceph: client4614 fsid 19b90bca-f1ae-47a6-93dd-0b03ee637949 [ 877.991965] libceph: mon0 (2)127.0.0.1:40674 session established [ 877.992334] libceph: client4617 fsid 19b90bca-f1ae-47a6-93dd-0b03ee637949 [ 878.017234] libceph: mon0 (2)127.0.0.1:40674 session established [ 878.017594] libceph: client4620 fsid 19b90bca-f1ae-47a6-93dd-0b03ee637949 [ 878.031394] xfsio (pid 18988) is setting deprecated v1 encryption policy; recommend upgrading to v2. [ 878.054528] libceph: mon0 (2)127.0.0.1:40674 session established [ 878.054892] libceph: client4623 fsid 19b90bca-f1ae-47a6-93dd-0b03ee637949 [ 878.070287] libceph: mon0 (2)127.0.0.1:40674 session established [ 878.070704] libceph: client4626 fsid 19b90bca-f1ae-47a6-93dd-0b03ee637949 [ 878.264586] libceph: mon0 (2)127.0.0.1:40674 session established [ 878.265258] libceph: client4629 fsid 19b90bca-f1ae-47a6-93dd-0b03ee637949 [ 878.374578] -----------[ cut here ]------------ [ 878.374586] kernel BUG at net/ceph/messenger.c:1070! [ 878.375150] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 878.378145] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 4759 Comm: kworker/2:9 Not tainted 6.13.0-rc5+ #1 [ 878.378969] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 [ 878.380167] Workqueue: ceph-msgr cephconworkfn [ 878.381639] RIP: 0010:cephmsgdatacursorinit+0x42/0x50 [ 878.382152] Code: 89 17 48 8b 46 70 55 48 89 47 08 c7 47 18 00 00 00 00 48 89 e5 e8 de cc ff ff 5d 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 31 ff c3 cc cc cc cc 0f 0b <0f> 0b 0f 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 [ 878.383928] RSP: 0018:ffffb4ffc7cbbd28 EFLAGS: 00010287 [ 878.384447] RAX: ffffffff82bb9ac0 RBX: ffff981390c2f1f8 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 878.385129] RDX: 0000000000009000 RSI: ffff981288232b58 RDI: ffff981390c2f378 [ 878.385839] RBP: ffffb4ffc7cbbe18 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 878.386539] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff981390c2f030 [ 878.387203] R13: ffff981288232b58 R14: 0000000000000029 R15: 0000000000000001 [ 878.387877] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9814b7900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 878.388663] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 878.389212] CR2: 00005e106a0554e0 CR3: 0000000112bf0001 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 878.389921] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 [ 878.390620] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 [ 878.391307] PKRU: 55555554 [ 878.391567] Call Trace: [ 878.391807] <TASK> [ 878.392021] ? showregs+0x71/0x90 [ 878.392391] ? die+0x38/0xa0 [ 878.392667] ? dotrap+0xdb/0x100 [ 878.392981] ? doerrortrap+0x75/0xb0 [ 878.393372] ? cephmsgdatacursorinit+0x42/0x50 [ 878.393842] ? excinvalidop+0x53/0x80 [ 878.394232] ? cephmsgdatacursorinit+0x42/0x50 [ 878.394694] ? asmexcinvalidop+0x1b/0x20 [ 878.395099] ? cephmsgdatacursorinit+0x42/0x50 [ 878.395583] ? cephconv2tryread+0xd16/0x2220 [ 878.396027] ? rawspinunlock+0xe/0x40 [ 878.396428] ? rawspinrqunlock+0x10/0x40 [ 878.396842] ? finishtaskswitch.isra.0+0x97/0x310 [ 878.397338] ? schedule+0x44b/0x16b0 [ 878.397738] cephconworkfn+0x326/0x750 [ 878.398121] processonework+0x188/0x3d0 [ 878.398522] ? pfxworkerthread+0x10/0x10 [ 878.398929] workerthread+0x2b5/0x3c0 [ 878.399310] ? pfxworkerthread+0x10/0x10 [ 878.399727] kthread+0xe1/0x120 [ 878.400031] ? pfxkthread+0x10/0x10 [ 878.400431] retfromfork+0x43/0x70 [ 878.400771] ? pfxkthread+0x10/0x10 [ 878.401127] retfromforkasm+0x1a/0x30 [ 878.401543] </TASK> [ 878.401760] Modules l ---truncated---

A flaw was found in the way signature calculation is handled by cephx protocol. The signature calculation is encrypting a 29 byte struct with 16-byte block AES cipher, and then using the first 8 bytes of the result as signature. This only covers first (16 by tes) cipher block, datacrc falls on second block.There are no known exploits against this, If attacker can alter the message payload any changes in datacrc will not be noticed or checked by signature check.

Ceph is a distributed object, block, and file storage platform. In versions up to and including 19.2.3, using the argument x-amz-copy-source to put an object and specifying an empty string as its content leads to the RGW daemon crashing, resulting in a DoS attack. As of time of publication, no known patched versions exist.

In Ceph, a format string flaw was found in the way libradosstriper parses input from user. A user could crash an application or service using the libradosstriper library.

A flaw was discovered in ceph. Assertion in rgwiampolicy.cc can be reached by user input and fail through data passed in from a rest call causing it to crash.

Upstream patch:

https://github.com/ceph/ceph/commit/b3118cabb8060a8cc6a01c4e8264cb18e7b1745a

Red Hat Ceph Storage is a scalable, open, software-defined storage platform that combines the most stable version of the Ceph storage system with a Ceph management platform, deployment utilities, and support services.Security Fix(es): ceph: Unauthenticated malformed HTTP requests handled by rgwcivetweb.cc:RGW::initenv() can lead to denial of service (CVE-2018-7262) For more details about the security issue(s), including the impact, a CVSS score, acknowledgments, and other related information, refer to the CVE page(s) listed in the References section.