Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability exists in Rucio versions 1.30.0 and later before 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1, in FilterEngine.createpostgresquery(). This allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the PostgreSQL metadata database through the DID search endpoint (GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search). When the postgresmeta metadata plugin is configured, attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into raw SQL strings via Python .format(), then passed to psycopg3's sql.SQL() which treats the string as trusted SQL syntax.

Depending on the database privileges assigned to the service account, exploitation can expose sensitive tables, modify or delete metadata, access server-side files, or achieve code execution through PostgreSQL features such as COPY ... FROM PROGRAM. This issue affects deployments that explicitly use the postgresmeta metadata plugin. This vulnerability has been fixed in versions 35.8.5, 38.5.5, 39.4.2, and 40.1.1.

Summary

A SQL injection vulnerability in the Oracle path of FilterEngine.createsqlaquery allows any authenticated Rucio user to execute arbitrary SQL against the backend database through the DID search endpoint (GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search). Attacker-controlled filter keys and values are interpolated directly into sqlalchemy.text via Python str.format, completely bypassing parameterization. This enables full database compromise including extraction of authentication tokens, password hashes, and all managed data identifiers. The vulnerability is affecting deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration jsonmeta with Oracle database backends.

Details

Will follow in two weeks (2025-05-19).

Impact

Vulnerability type: SQL Injection (CWE-89)

Who is impacted:

- All Oracle-based Rucio deployments using the default metadata plugin configuration (jsonmeta). - Not affected are PostgreSQL/MySQL deployments using the default jsonmeta plugin (SQLAlchemy parameterizes the JSON path operations via bind parameters on non-Oracle dialects).

What an attacker can do:

- Full database read access: Extract any table including identities (password hashes and salts), tokens (active authentication sessions), accounts (user enumeration), rsesettings (storage endpoint credentials), and rules (data management policies). - Password hash extraction: Combined with Rucio's use of single-iteration SHA-256 for password hashing (no KDF), extracted hashes can be cracked at GPU speed. - Authentication token theft: Active bearer tokens can be extracted and used for immediate session hijacking. - Data modification: Oracle PL/SQL enables INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE operations via DML within subqueries and PL/SQL blocks. - Potential remote code execution: Via Oracle's UTLHTTP, DBMSSCHEDULER, or Java stored procedures if the database user has elevated privileges.

Required attacker privileges: Any authenticated Rucio user. Authentication tokens can be obtained via any supported method (userpass, x509, OIDC, SAML, SSH, GSS). No special roles or administrative permissions are required. The GET /dids/<scope>/dids/search endpoint is available to all authenticated users.