Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
3.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Related public issue (context, not a duplicate)

Closed issue #1429 ("Handle non-UTF-8 paths", 2024-03-24) raised exactly this general concern and even suggested detection via pregmatch('//u', $path) !== 1 -- note the reporter's suggested check explicitly compares !== 1, which would correctly treat PCRE's false return as "reject." The maintainer's reply pointed to the PathNormalizer interface as the place to implement this. The control-character check that ended up shipping in WhitespacePathNormalizer (if (pregmatch('#\p{C}+#u', $unixPath))) addresses the general concern but does not use the !== 1-style comparison the original issue suggested -- it uses a bare truthy check, which is exactly the gap this report demonstrates. So this is not a duplicate of #1429; it's a concrete bypass surviving in the fix that issue's concern led to.

Vulnerability Details

File: src/WhitespacePathNormalizer.php, lines 22-28 (normalizePath()) -- the default PathNormalizer used by Filesystem for every adapter (Local, FTP, SFTP, S3, AsyncAwsS3, Azure, GCS, ZipArchive, GridFS, InMemory) unless the application supplies a custom one.

Root Cause

php public function normalizePath(string $path): string { $unixPath = strreplace('\\', '/', $path);

if (pregmatch('#\p{C}+#u', $unixPath)) { throw CorruptedPathDetected::forPath($path); } ...

pregmatch() returns false (a PHP engine error) rather than 0 when the subject string is not valid UTF-8 and the pattern uses the /u modifier -- PCRE can't even attempt the match. false and 0 are both falsy in PHP, and if (pregmatch(...)) does not distinguish them. So a path containing any single invalid UTF-8 byte anywhere in the string makes pregmatch() fail with a "Malformed UTF-8 characters" engine error, the if evaluates false, and CorruptedPathDetected is silently not thrown -- even when the same string also contains literal control characters this exact check exists to catch.

the identical payload IS correctly rejected once it's valid UTF-8: php $n->normalizePath("foo\x1bbar"); // valid UTF-8, contains ESC -> throws CorruptedPathDetected (correct) $n->normalizePath("foo\x80\x1bbar"); // 0x80 = invalid lone UTF-8 continuation byte -> NOT thrown (bypass)

The path-traversal protection is unaffected -- it's exact byte-string comparison on /-delimited segments, independent of UTF-8 validity: php $n->normalizePath("\x80/../../etc/passwd"); // still throws PathTraversalDetected

Recommended Fix php public function normalizePath(string $path): string { $unixPath = strreplace('\\', '/', $path); $matched = pregmatch('#\p{C}+#u', $unixPath);

if ($matched !== 0) { // $matched === false means malformed UTF-8 -- must also be treated as corrupted, // not silently allowed through. throw CorruptedPathDetected::forPath($path); } ...

Verification Dynamically confirmed on league/flysystem HEAD 6837e1d / tag 3.35.2, PHP 8.4.22 CLI, end-to-end through LocalFilesystemAdapter: [1] write() succeeded -- normalizer did NOT reject the path. [2] Actual bytes on disk: ...801b5b386d6e6f726d616c2d6c6f6f6b696e672d66696c652e7478741b5b306d... [3] Filesystem::listContents() path contains raw ESC (0x1b): YES [4] Raw terminal output (via cat -v): M-^@^[[8mnormal-looking-file.txt^[[0m^[[2K^[[1Aurgent-invoice.pdf

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

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