Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
8.2
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

web-token jwt-framework and jwt-library before 3.4.12, 4.0.x before 4.0.8, 4.1.x before 4.1.10, and 4.2.x before 4.2.4, and jwt-encryption-algorithm-ecdh-es through 3.2.10, have a ConcatKDF::generate() that performs a single SHA-256 round, deriving at most 32 bytes for ECDH-ES and ECDH-SS direct key agreement. Anyone holding a JWE using A256CBC-HS512 can decrypt it under an all-zero AES key, while A192CBC-HS384 content keys have only 64-bit strength.

First published (updated )
Severity
8.2
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Impact

RSACrypt::decryptWithRSA15() (used by the RSA15 key-encryption algorithm) implements RSAES-PKCS1-v15 decryption by inspecting the padding after RSADP and throwing InvalidArgumentException as soon as the padding is malformed. It does not implement the implicit-rejection countermeasure required by RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 (return a deterministic pseudo-random value of the expected length on padding failure and let the downstream step fail uniformly).

From a JWE caller this yields a Bleichenbacher/Marvin padding oracle: an attacker submitting adaptively crafted encryptedkey values can distinguish (a) padding rejected, (b) padding valid but wrong CEK length, and (c) padding valid and full AEAD executed — even though JWEDecrypter returns the same false in all cases — because each path performs a measurably different amount of work, amplifiable by enlarging the ciphertext (CWE-208 timing side channel). Enough adaptive queries can recover the wrapped CEK.

Affected configurations

Applications that register RSA15 in their decryption AlgorithmManager and hold an RSA private key.

Patches

PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption now performs implicit rejection: on invalid padding (or unexpected recovered length) it returns a random CEK of the expected size selected in constant time, so the full content-decryption (AEAD) step always runs and fails uniformly, removing the observable difference between padding-valid and padding-invalid ciphertexts. Users are still strongly encouraged to migrate to RSA-OAEP.

Workarounds

Prefer RSA-OAEP/RSA-OAEP-256; do not enable RSA15 for untrusted tokens.

References

- RFC 3447 §7.2.2 / RFC 8017 §7.1.2 - Bleichenbacher (1998); Marvin attack - CWE-208: Observable Timing Discrepancy

Résolution

Un correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur 3.4.x, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1).

RSA15 — déchiffrement PKCS#1 v1.5 avec implicit rejection en temps constant (RFC 3447 §7.2.2) : un padding invalide n'est plus distinguable d'un padding valide, neutralisant l'oracle Bleichenbacher.

Validation : php -l OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs 3.4.x), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue 3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x.

1 / 2
Source: OSV
First published (updated )
Severity
8.7
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Impact

When a JWE uses a password-based key-encryption algorithm (PBES2-HS256+A128KW, PBES2-HS384+A192KW, PBES2-HS512+A256KW), PBES2AESKW::unwrapKey() reads the p2c (PBKDF2 iteration count) parameter directly from the attacker-controlled JOSE header and passes it to hashpbkdf2() with no upper bound. The only validation performed (checkHeaderAdditionalParameters()) was isint($p2c) && $p2c > 0.

An unauthenticated attacker can craft a single JWE whose protected header sets a very large p2c (e.g. 100000000 ≈ 87 s of CPU, or PHPINTMAX), forcing a worker to spend an arbitrary amount of CPU inside PBKDF2 before the key unwrap can even fail. The decrypter swallows the eventual exception, so the attacker pays almost nothing while the server burns CPU. JSON General serialization (multiple recipients) and multi-key JWKSets multiply the cost. This is a classic uncontrolled-resource-consumption (CWE-400) denial of service.

Affected configurations

Applications that register any PBES2-HS+AKW algorithm in their decryption AlgorithmManager.

Patches

PBES2AESKW now enforces a configurable maximum iteration count (DEFAULTMAXCOUNT = 1000000, well above realistic legitimate values which are a few thousand) in checkHeaderAdditionalParameters(), before any PBKDF2 computation. The bound is exposed as a constructor argument so operators can tune it.

Workarounds

Before upgrading: validate/limit the p2c header with a custom header checker, or do not enable PBES2 algorithms for untrusted tokens.

References

- RFC 7518 §4.8 (PBES2) - CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Résolution

Un correctif a été préparé sur une branche dédiée basée sur 3.4.x, avec des tests anti-régression dédiés (fork privé temporaire de cette advisory, PR #1).

PBES2 — PBES2AESKW::unwrapKey() borne désormais le paramètre p2c (constante DEFAULTMAXCOUNT = 1000000, configurable via le constructeur) avant tout appel à hashpbkdf2(), empêchant l'amplification CPU (DoS).

Validation : php -l OK, PHPUnit vert, aucune nouvelle erreur PHPStan introduite (différentiel nul vs 3.4.x), aucun commentaire ajouté dans le code source. Après merge, cascade prévue 3.4.x → 4.0.x → 4.1.x.

1 / 2
Source: OSV
First published (updated )

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