The Python ecosystem is pushing towards using https://pypi.org/project/truststore/ rather than solutions like certifi. This incident will likely help increase the priority of that transition.

On Fri, 2026-10-23 at 00:07 +0300, Valtteri Vuorikoski wrote: Having spent the day whacking this particular molehill, my strong opinion is that these packages (minus certifi) should stop vendoring roots immediately.

Users should install their distro's ca-certificates package or similar. If that is completely impossible for whatever reason, offer an option to use certifi (which should be a dependency, not vendored) - but the system trust store should be the default source of truth.

This sort of easter egg hiding to serve users with broken installations reduces the security of everyone else.

(Missing from the quoted list: botocore also includes a vendored copy. I haven't checked how it's used.)

-valtteri

On Thu, Oct 22, 2026 at 01:43:08PM -0700, Alan Coopersmith wrote: https://discuss.python.org/t/information-for-python-users-regarding-emudhra-emsign-ca-certificate-security-incident/109576 has this statement from Seth Michael Larson: A security incident affecting eMudhra intermediate certificates has required removing the emSign root CA certificate from CA bundles such as “certifi”. It’s important to immediately upgrade the software packages below to at least the versions specified and rebuild container images with layer caching disabled to fetch the latest system certificates. Failure to do so could result in monster-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks against TLS clients, including python.org and pypi.org .

certifi 2026.10.19 (1)     pip 26.2.2     uv 0.13.4     sigstore 4.5.1     conda 26.9.4     pixi 0.82.1