In ScreenConnect™ versions prior to 26.2, input validation within the Host Pass creation functionality could allow an authenticated user with Host Pass creation privileges the ability to specify a token expiration duration beyond the intended maximum when generating delegated access tokens.
ConnectWise ScreenConnect 23.9.7 and prior are affected by path-traversal vulnerability, which may allow an attacker
the ability to execute remote code or directly impact confidential data or critical systems.
A condition in the ScreenConnect server component may allow an actor with access to server-level cryptographic material used for authentication to obtain unauthorized access, including elevated privileges, in certain scenarios. ScreenConnect host and guest client agents are not independently affected by this CVE.
ConnectWise ScreenConnect contains an improper authentication vulnerability. This vulnerability could allow a ViewState code injection attack, which could allow remote code execution if machine keys are compromised.
ConnectWise ScreenConnect 23.9.7 and prior are affected by an Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel
vulnerability, which may allow an attacker direct access to confidential information or
critical systems.
UniFi: 10.0 NVD - CVE-2026-22557 ScreenConnect: 9.0 NVD - CVE-2026-3564
Nobody has said it yet (not that I've heard), but this would be how I assume adversarial AI systems enter the arena. Hopefully these were security researchers using tools to bug hunt & claim bounties, but two major players in the same week - makes me wonder.
As I've been telling friends and clients, the rate of small intrusion to network takeover is accelerating. The window to respond is closing. Historically, a foothold gave enough time to detect, triage, & remediate, at attack team/human operation cycles. Humans vs humans, you've got (some) time.
My hypothesis/assumption here, but that rate is probably thrown out the window. A small breach + rapidly iterating attacks against all internal services will turn up the next weakness in the chain, until full access is accomplished.
These AI systems are like a 50-Cal Rifle, you use them to punch a hole into the network, and the attack pours through that hole.
For defenders, you can't be constantly on guard, can't be constantly ready to "fire back" or deploy time/energy chasing down everything that makes the system throw an alert.
Maybe I'm just a bit burned out, but two days in a row my evenings have gone to shit, as I'm digging through logs and reading up on the next problem to tackle tomorrow - and meanwhile keeping clients advised of what's going on, and still trying to leverage remote support via tools that are BROKEN because of the PATCH - effing ScreenConnect - no notice no comms - not a care in the world to share it with PAYING CUSTOMERS.
In versions of ScreenConnect™ prior to 25.8, server-side validation and integrity checks within the extension subsystem could allow the installation and execution of untrusted or arbitrary extensions by authorized or administrative users. Abuse of this behavior could result in the execution of custom code on the server or unauthorized access to application configuration data. This issue affects only the ScreenConnect server component; host and guest clients are not impacted. ScreenConnect 25.8 introduces enhanced server-side configuration handling and integrity checks to ensure only trusted extensions can be installed.
In deployments using the ScreenConnect™ Certificate Signing Extension, encrypted configuration values including an Azure Key Vault-related key, could be returned to unauthenticated users through a client-facing endpoint under certain conditions. The values remained encrypted and securely stored at rest; however, an encrypted representation could be exposed in client responses. Updating the Certificate Signing Extension to version 1.0.12 or higher ensures configuration handling occurs exclusively on the server side, preventing encrypted values from being transmitted to or rendered by client-side components.
ConnectWise ScreenConnect versions 22.6 and below contained a flaw allowing potential brute force attacks on custom access tokens due to inadequate rate-limiting controls in the default configuration. Attackers could exploit this vulnerability to gain unauthorized access by repeatedly attempting access code combinations. ConnectWise has addressed this issue in later versions by implementing rate-limiting controls as a preventive measure against brute force attacks.