Contiki-NG's DNS/mDNS resolver skipname() in os/services/resolv/resolv.c walks DNS wire-format name labels with no packet-boundary check, and the caller in newdata() invokes it in a loop iterating nquestions times from the attacker-controlled DNS header before validating the transaction ID. An attacker who sets nquestions higher than the number of complete questions present causes skipname() to walk past the UDP packet buffer, and the returned pointer is cast to struct dnsanswer for further memory reads. On builds with RESOLVCONFSUPPORTSMDNS enabled, any peer on the local segment can trigger the read unauthenticated via a multicast UDP 5353 packet with no outstanding query required; on standard DNS builds an attacker who can inject a UDP response from port 53 during an outstanding query can trigger the same read. Impact is out-of-bounds read of uipbuf and adjacent memory, disclosing memory contents or crashing the resolver.