Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
4.9
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Summary

An authenticated control panel user with only accessCp can move entries across sections via POST /actions/entries/move-to-section, even when they do not have saveEntries:{sectionUid} permission for either source or destination section.

Details

Root-cause analysis

1. actionMoveToSection accepts sectionId and entryIds, loads entries, and iterates: Craft::$app->getEntries()->moveEntryToSection($entry, $section). 2. The endpoint does not enforce per-entry or per-section authorization checks. 3. moveEntryToSection() also does not enforce current-user authorization. 4. There is a permission check in actionMoveToSectionModalData for building UI options, but that check is not enforced in the actual endpoint. 5. Therefore, a direct POST request can bypass UI filtering and perform unauthorized entry moves.

### Impact

This is an authorization bypass permitting unauthorized content changes. Authenticated low-privileged control panel users can move entries they should not be able to manage, violating integrity and potentially disrupting routing/editorial controls.

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Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

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