Cursor is a code editor built for programming with AI. Prior to 2.0 ,if a visited website contains maliciously crafted instructions, the model may attempt to follow them in order to “assist” the user. When combined with a bypass of the command whitelist mechanism, such indirect prompt injections could result in commands being executed automatically, without the user’s explicit intent, thereby posing a significant security risk. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.0.

Cursor is a code editor built for programming with AI. Sandbox escape via writing .git configuration was possible in versions prior to 2.5. A malicious agent (ie prompt injection) could write to improperly protected .git settings, including git hooks, which may cause out-of-sandbox RCE next time they are triggered. No user interaction was required as Git executes these commands automatically. Fixed in version 2.5.

Cursor is a code editor built for programming with AI. Prior to 2.3, hen the Cursor Agent is running in Auto-Run Mode with Allowlist mode enabled, certain shell built-ins can still be executed without appearing in the allowlist and without requiring user approval. This allows an attacker via indirect or direct prompt injection to poison the shell environment by setting, modifying, or removing environment variables that influence trusted commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.3.

The configuration of Cursor on macOS, specifically the "RunAsNode" fuse enabled, allows a local attacker with unprivileged access to execute arbitrary code that inherits Cursor TCC (Transparency, Consent, and Control) permissions. Acquired resource access is limited to previously granted permissions by the user. Accessing other resources beyond previously granted TCC permissions will prompt the user for approval in the name of Cursor, potentially disguising attacker's malicious intent.

This issue was detected in 15.4.1 version of Cursor. Project maintainers decided not to fix this issue, because a scenario including a local attacker falls outside their defined threat model.

Cursor is a code editor built for programming with AI. In versions 1.2.4 and below, attackers can achieve remote and persistent code execution by modifying an already trusted MCP configuration file inside a shared GitHub repository or editing the file locally on the target's machine. Once a collaborator accepts a harmless MCP, the attacker can silently swap it for a malicious command (e.g., calc.exe) without triggering any warning or re-prompt. If an attacker has write permissions on a user's active branches of a source repository that contains existing MCP servers the user has previously approved, or allows an attacker has arbitrary file-write locally, the attacker can achieve arbitrary code execution. This is fixed in version 1.3.

ToDesktop before 2024-10-03, as used by Cursor before 2024-10-03 and other applications, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands on the build server (e.g., read secrets from the desktopify config.prod.json file), and consequently deploy updates to any app, via a postinstall script in package.json. No exploitation occurred.