A flaw was found in Dogtag PKI (pki-core). The CMCAuthForEST authentication plugin fails open when an EST fullcmc enrollment request is submitted via BasicAuth without an end-user TLS client certificate. In this scenario, the SSLCLIENTCERT session attribute retains the EST subsystem's own agent certificate instead of being replaced by the end-user's certificate. The parent CMCAuth.verifySignerInfo() then compares the CMC signer's Subject DN against this agent certificate using DER byte comparison, which passes if the attacker crafts a self-signed certificate with a DER-matching Subject DN. The signer certificate's trust chain is not validated — verifySignerInfo() only verifies the CMC message signature against the bundled signer cert's own public key, which trivially passes since the attacker possesses the corresponding private key. Since CMCAuthForEST overrides authenticateCAUser() to skip CA user database verification, and RAHeaderClientCertSubjectNameConstraint sees the agent certificate in SSLCLIENTCERT and allows any subject name for agents, the CA issues a valid certificate with the attacker's requested arbitrary subject. An authenticated EST user with BasicAuth credentials can exploit this to obtain CA-signed certificates impersonating any entity.

A flaw was found in pki-core. The v2 REST ACL filter (org.dogtagpki.server.rest.v2.filters.ACLFilter) resolves a request to an ACL permission by regex-matching candidate keys and then selecting the lexicographically largest match via Comparator.reverseOrder().findFirst(), rather than the most specific match. Because the wildcard placeholder character '{' (0x7B) sorts above lowercase ASCII letters, a wildcard key beats a colliding literal key. In the CA's ProfileACL filter, the literal key "POST:raw" (intended to require the profiles.create permission, gated to the Administrators group via the certServer.profile.configuration ACI) collides with the wildcard key "POST:{}" (mapped to profiles.approve, gated to the Certificate Manager Agents group via the certServer.ca.profile ACI). For a request to POST /v2/profiles/raw, both keys match and the wildcard wins, so the endpoint is authorized under profiles.approve instead of profiles.create. Routing to the handler itself is correct (PKIServlet's dispatcher and the sibling AuthMethodFilter both use Comparator.naturalOrder() for the identical collision shape and pick the literal match) -- only ACLFilter's independent authorization tie-break disagrees with its own sibling filters and picks the wrong permission. As a result, an authenticated user holding only the Certificate Manager Agents role -- not an Administrator -- can invoke createProfileRaw, which builds a new certificate profile directly from an attacker-supplied raw byte stream, and can then enable that profile using their own legitimate profiles.approve permission. This lets a CA Agent author and activate an arbitrary certificate-issuance profile, a privilege-escalation path from the CA Agent role to effective control over the CA's issuance policy. The vulnerable code was confirmed present, by direct source and bytecode inspection, in the pki-core 11.6.0 and 11.7.1 lines (RHEL 9); it is absent from the older pki-core 10.x line (RHEL 7/8), which uses a different, unaffected REST architecture. No non-default configuration is required to reach this path on affected versions; the v2 REST API is network-reachable and cert-auth-wired identically to v1 in production IdM/RHCS deployments (confirmed via the ipa-pki-proxy.conf reverse-proxy configuration).