Eclipse Kura versions prior to 5.6.2 trust the client-supplied X-Forwarded-For HTTP header as the authoritative source of the client IP address in audit log entries. The org.eclipse.kura.web2 (Web Console) and org.eclipse.kura.rest.provider (REST API) components use this header as the primary IP source when initializing audit context, and org.eclipse.kura.jetty.customizer unconditionally installs Jetty's ForwardedRequestCustomizer on all HTTP/HTTPS connectors, causing HttpServletRequest.getRemoteAddr() to reflect the attacker-controlled header value. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to bypass IP-based brute-force protections — such as fail2ban — by spoofing the logged IP address to a non-routable value, allowing a brute-force attack to proceed undetected, or to cause a denial of service against a third party by injecting a victim's IP address and triggering a ban on that address.

In Eclipse Kura LogServlet component included in versions 5.0.0 to 5.4.1, a specifically crafted request to the servlet can allow an unauthenticated user to retrieve the device logs. Also, downloaded logs may be used by an attacker to perform privilege escalation by using the session id of an authenticated user reported in logs.

This issue affects org.eclipse.kura:org.eclipse.kura.web2 version range [2.0.600, 2.4.0], which is included in Eclipse Kura version range [5.0.0, 5.4.1]