Impact
Electerm's terminal hyperlink handler passes any URL clicked in the terminal directly to shell.openExternal without any protocol validation.
When a user connects to a malicious SSH server, the attacker can print a crafted URI in the terminal output. If the victim clicks the link, shell.openExternal executes it using the operating system's default protocol handler.
This can be abused to: - Trigger dangerous protocol handlers (ms-msdt:, search-ms:) for code execution - Open local files or network shares (file://, UNC paths) to leak NTLM hashes or exfiltrate data - Launch any installed application associated with a custom URI scheme
An attacker who controls terminal output (e.g., via a malicious SSH server, compromised remote host, or malicious plugin rendering terminal content) can thus achieve arbitrary code execution or local file access on the victim's machine, requiring only that the victim clicks a displayed link.
Patches
As of electerm v3.7.9, no official patch has been released. Users should monitor the project’s GitHub releases and security page for an update addressing this issue.
Workarounds
Until a patch is available: - Do not click on any links displayed in terminal sessions connected to untrusted servers. - If possible, disable hyperlink rendering in electerm's terminal settings. - Use a terminal multiplexer (e.g., tmux) or a separate terminal application that filters URI schemes when working with untrusted hosts. - Consider running electerm in a restricted environment (sandbox, AppArmor, SELinux) that limits the spawning of protocol handlers.
Resources
- electerm GitHub Repository - electerm Security Policy - Vulnerability details originally reported by external researcher (confirmed on v3.7.9, Win10).
Impact
The getConstants() IPC handler in src/app/lib/ipc-sync.js serialises the entire process.env object and sends it to the renderer. The data is stored as window.pre.env and is accessible from any JavaScript running in the renderer (e.g., via the DevTools console or a compromised webview context).
On developer and CI machines, process.env routinely contains secrets such as:
- AWSSECRETACCESSKEY / AWSSESSIONTOKEN - GITHUBTOKEN / NPMTOKEN - OPENAIAPIKEY / DOCKERAUTH - Internal service credentials, API keys, and database URLs
An attacker who achieves any JavaScript execution within the renderer—for example, through a malicious plugin, a cross-site scripting (XSS) flaw, or the terminal hyperlink execution chain—can trivially exfiltrate these secrets to a remote server, leading to cloud account compromise, supply chain attacks, and lateral movement. The exposure is visible even without any code execution by simply opening the "Info" modal in the application, though that requires local access.
Patches
A patch is yet to be available.
Workarounds
Until a patch is released: - Avoid launching electerm with sensitive environment variables set. Use shell scripts or a dedicated terminal profile that clears secrets before starting the application. - Do not install plugins from untrusted sources, and audit any installed plugins for network access. - Keep the renderer context as locked down as possible: disable the remote debugging port, and do not paste untrusted code into the DevTools console.
Resources - electerm GitHub Repository - electerm Security Policy - Vulnerability details originally reported by external researcher (confirmed on v3.7.9, Win10).