Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
3.3
Null Pointer Dereference
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Impact Apps that call clipboard.readImage() may be vulnerable to a denial of service. If the system clipboard contains image data that fails to decode, the resulting null bitmap is passed unchecked to image construction, triggering a controlled abort and crashing the process.

Apps are only affected if they call clipboard.readImage(). Apps that do not read images from the clipboard are not affected. This issue does not allow memory corruption or code execution.

Workarounds Validate that the clipboard contains image data via clipboard.availableFormats() before calling clipboard.readImage(). Note this only narrows the window — upgrading to a fixed version is recommended.

Fixed Versions 42.0.0-alpha.5 41.1.0 40.8.5 39.8.5

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L

Impact When a renderer calls window.open() with a target name, Electron did not correctly scope the named-window lookup to the opener's browsing context group. A renderer could navigate an existing child window that was opened by a different, unrelated renderer if both used the same target name. If that existing child was created with more permissive webPreferences (via setWindowOpenHandler's overrideBrowserWindowOptions), content loaded by the second renderer inherits those permissions.

Apps are only affected if they open multiple top-level windows with differing trust levels and use setWindowOpenHandler to grant child windows elevated webPreferences such as a privileged preload script. Apps that do not elevate child window privileges, or that use a single top-level window, are not affected.

Apps that additionally grant nodeIntegration: true or sandbox: false to child windows (contrary to the security recommendations) may be exposed to arbitrary code execution.

Workarounds Deny window.open() in renderers that load untrusted content by returning { action: 'deny' } from setWindowOpenHandler. Avoid granting child windows more permissive webPreferences than their opener.

Fixed Versions 42.0.0-alpha.5 41.1.0 40.8.5 39.8.5

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, email us at security@electronjs.org

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203