Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
7.5
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

HTTP/2 Rapid reset attack The HTTP/2 protocol allows clients to indicate to the server that a previous stream should be canceled by sending a RSTSTREAM frame. The protocol does not require the client and server to coordinate the cancellation in any way, the client may do it unilaterally. The client may also assume that the cancellation will take effect immediately when the server receives the RSTSTREAM frame, before any other data from that TCP connection is processed.

Abuse of this feature is called a Rapid Reset attack because it relies on the ability for an endpoint to send a RSTSTREAM frame immediately after sending a request frame, which makes the other endpoint start working and then rapidly resets the request. The request is canceled, but leaves the HTTP/2 connection open.

The HTTP/2 Rapid Reset attack built on this capability is simple: The client opens a large number of streams at once as in the standard HTTP/2 attack, but rather than waiting for a response to each request stream from the server or proxy, the client cancels each request immediately.

The ability to reset streams immediately allows each connection to have an indefinite number of requests in flight. By explicitly canceling the requests, the attacker never exceeds the limit on the number of concurrent open streams. The number of in-flight requests is no longer dependent on the round-trip time (RTT), but only on the available network bandwidth.

In a typical HTTP/2 server implementation, the server will still have to do significant amounts of work for canceled requests, such as allocating new stream data structures, parsing the query and doing header decompression, and mapping the URL to a resource. For reverse proxy implementations, the request may be proxied to the backend server before the RSTSTREAM frame is processed. The client on the other hand paid almost no costs for sending the requests. This creates an exploitable cost asymmetry between the server and the client.

Multiple software artifacts implementing HTTP/2 are affected. This advisory was originally ingested from the swift-nio-http2 repo advisory and their original conent follows.

swift-nio-http2 specific advisory swift-nio-http2 is vulnerable to a denial-of-service vulnerability in which a malicious client can create and then reset a large number of HTTP/2 streams in a short period of time. This causes swift-nio-http2 to commit to a large amount of expensive work which it then throws away, including creating entirely new Channels to serve the traffic. This can easily overwhelm an EventLoop and prevent it from making forward progress.

swift-nio-http2 1.28 contains a remediation for this issue that applies reset counter using a sliding window. This constrains the number of stream resets that may occur in a given window of time. Clients violating this limit will have their connections torn down. This allows clients to continue to cancel streams for legitimate reasons, while constraining malicious actors.

1 / 8
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
6.9
XSS
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

Impact Passing HTML containing <option> elements from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing them - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code.

Patches This problem is patched in jQuery 3.5.0.

Workarounds To workaround this issue without upgrading, use DOMPurify with its SAFEFORJQUERY option to sanitize the HTML string before passing it to a jQuery method.

References https://blog.jquery.com/2020/04/10/jquery-3-5-0-released/

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, search for a relevant issue in the jQuery repo. If you don't find an answer, open a new issue.

1 / 7
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.3
Buffer Overflow
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

F5 BIG-IP APM contains a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability that could allow a threat actor to achieve remote code execution.

1 / 3
Source: CISA
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
Command Injection
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Apache HTTP Server contains an improper escaping of output vulnerability in modrewrite that allows an attacker to map URLs to filesystem locations that are permitted to be served by the server but are not intentionally/directly reachable by any URL, resulting in code execution or source code disclosure.

1 / 6
Source: CISA
First published (updated )
Severity
8.8
SQL Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

An authenticated SQL injection vulnerability exists in the BIG-IP Configuration utility which

may allow an authenticated attacker with network access to the Configuration utility through the BIG-IP management port and/or self IP addresses to execute arbitrary system commands.

Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated

1 / 3
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Path Traversal
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

F5 BIG-IP Configuration utility contains an authentication bypass using an alternate path or channel vulnerability due to undisclosed requests that may allow an unauthenticated attacker with network access to the BIG-IP system through the management port and/or self IP addresses to execute system commands. This vulnerability can be used in conjunction with CVE-2023-46748.

1 / 3
Source: CISA
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

F5 BIG-IP contains a missing authentication in critical function vulnerability which can allow for remote code execution, creation or deletion of files, or disabling services.

1 / 2
Source: CISA
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Path Traversal
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In BIG-IP versions 15.0.0-15.1.0.3, 14.1.0-14.1.2.5, 13.1.0-13.1.3.3, 12.1.0-12.1.5.1, and 11.6.1-11.6.5.1, the Traffic Management User Interface (TMUI), also referred to as the Configuration utility, has a Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability in undisclosed pages.

1 / 4
First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
Infoleak
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U/RL:O/RC:C

A fundamental design flaw within the RADIUS protocol has been proven to be exploitable, compromising the integrity in the RADIUS Access-Request process. The attack allows a malicious user to modify packets in a way that would be indistinguishable to a RADIUS client or server. To be successful, the attacker must have the ability to inject themselves between the client and server.

1 / 6
Source: FortiGuard

Remedy

Disable the use of RADIUS/UDP and RADIUS/TCP - instead RADIUS/TLS or RADIUS/DTLS should be used.

Remedy

TBD

Remedy

The best way to address this issue is by using encrypted and authenticated channels that offer modern cryptographic security guarantees. Configure an alternate authentication mechanism if you are using RADIUS with a CHAP or PAP authentication protocol. PAN-OS provides the following alternate RADIUS authentication mechanisms: PEAP-MSCHAPv2 (default), PEAP with GTC, and EAP-TTLS with PAP. For more information, please see https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/pan-os/11-1/pan-os-admin/authentication/configure-radius-authentication. In addition, instead of using RADIUS, you can configure an alternate authentication mechanism using one of the options described here: https://docs.paloaltonetworks.com/pan-os/11-1/pan-os-admin/authentication. If you are a Prisma Access customer using a RADIUS configuration with PAP or CHAP in your profile and have not applied one of the changes described above, please reach out to TAC/CS to schedule an upgrade window. PAN-OS 9.1.19, PAN-OS 10.1.14, PAN-OS 10.2.10, PAN-OS 11.0.7, PAN-OS 11.1.3, and all later PAN-OS versions add a new feature to enforce an authentication check in RADIUS. This new feature is disabled by default to match the existing behavior. To enable this feature, run the following commands: > set auth radius-require-msg-authentic yes To confirm that the setting was correctly enabled, run the following command: > show auth radius-require-msg-authentic If set correctly, the response will say "yes". This setting is persistent across reboots. No ‘commit’ is required for this to take effect. Please note that this feature requires that the RADIUS server has been updated to support the new protocol changes, as detailed in https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/456537. If your RADIUS authentication breaks when radius-require-msg-authentic is set to yes, please work with your RADIUS server vendor for support with the RADIUS server upgrade process.
First published (updated )

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