The original TLS protocol includes a weakness in master secret negotiation, potentially allowing the Triple Handshake Attack that is mitigated by the Extended Master Secret (EMS) extension defined in RFC 7627.
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.
In BIG-IP versions 17.0.x before 17.0.0.1, 16.1.x before 16.1.3.1, 15.1.x before 15.1.7, 14.1.x before 14.1.5.1, and all versions of 13.1.x, and BIG-IQ all versions of 8.x and 7.x, an authenticated iControl REST user can cause an increase in memory resource utilization, via undisclosed requests.
A vulnerability was found in OpenSSL 1.0.2. When an application encounters a fatal protocol error and then calls SSLshutdown() twice, OpenSSL can respond differently to the calling application if a 0 byte record is received with invalid padding compared to if a 0 byte record is received with an invalid MAC. This difference in behaviour can be detected by a remote peer, then this amounts to a padding oracle that could be used to decrypt data. In order for this to be exploitable "non-stitched" ciphersuites must be in use. Also the application must call SSLshutdown() twice even if a protocol error has occurred (applications should not do this but some do anyway). AEAD ciphersuites are not impacted. This issue does not impact OpenSSL 1.1.1 or 1.1.0.
Upstream bug: https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20190226.txt
Upstream Patch: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/e9bbefbf0f24c57645e7ad6a5a71ae649d18ac8e