Description
NGINX Gateway Fabric has a vulnerability when it renders the spec.basic.realm (and spec.jwt.realm) field of a namespaced AuthenticationFilter verbatim, unescaped and unvalidated, into the shared data-plane nginx.conf as authbasic "<realm>";. A namespaced authenticated attacker that configures AuthenticationFilter CRD to an HTTPRoute/GRPCRoute on a shared Gateway can craft a realm value that closes the quoted directive and the enclosing location {} block and injects arbitrary NGINX directives into that Gateway's data-plane config.
Impact
A remote authenticated attacker can send crafted requests to configure NGINX Gateway Fabric AuthenticationFilter CRD and may be able to read every co-located tenant's mounted secrets, SSRF via proxypass, reading the pod ServiceAccount token, or hijacking other tenants' routes. There is no data plane exposure; this is a control plane issue only.
Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
NGINX Gateway Fabric has a vulnerability when it renders spec.basic.realm and spec.jwt.realm of a namespaced AuthenticationFilter Custom Resource Definition (CRD) verbatim, unescaped and unvalidated, into the shared data plane nginx.conf as authbasic "<realm>";. A namespaced authenticated attacker that configures the AuthenticationFilter CRD to an HTTPRoute/GRPCRoute on a shared Gateway can craft a realm value that closes the quoted directive and the enclosing location {} block and injects arbitrary NGINX directives into that Gateway's data plane configuration.
A vulnerability exists in NGINX OSS and NGINX Plus when configured to proxy to upstream Transport Layer Security (TLS) servers. An attacker with a man-in-the-middle (MITM) position on the upstream server side—along with conditions beyond the attacker's control—may be able to inject plain text data into the response from an upstream proxied server.
A vulnerability exists in NGINX OSS and NGINX Plus when configured to proxy to upstream Transport Layer Security (TLS) servers. An attacker with a man-in-the-middle (MITM) position on the upstream server side—along with conditions beyond the attacker's control—may be able to inject plain text data into the response from an upstream proxied server.