@fastify/multipart is a Fastify plugin for parsing the multipart content-type. Prior to versions 8.3.1 and 9.0.3, the saveRequestFiles function does not delete the uploaded temporary files when user cancels the request. The issue is fixed in versions 8.3.1 and 9.0.3. As a workaround, do not use saveRequestFiles.

@fastify/multipart is a Fastify plugin to parse the multipart content-type. Prior to versions 7.4.1 and 6.0.1, @fastify/multipart may experience denial of service due to a number of situations in which an unlimited number of parts are accepted. This includes the multipart body parser accepting an unlimited number of file parts, the multipart body parser accepting an unlimited number of field parts, and the multipart body parser accepting an unlimited number of empty parts as field parts. This is fixed in v7.4.1 (for Fastify v4.x) and v6.0.1 (for Fastify v3.x). There are no known workarounds.

fastify is a fast and low overhead web framework, for Node.js. Affected versions of fastify are subject to a denial of service via malicious use of the Content-Type header. An attacker can send an invalid Content-Type header that can cause the application to crash. This issue has been addressed in commit fbb07e8d and will be included in release version 4.8.1. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade may manually filter out http content with malicious Content-Type headers.

github-action-merge-dependabot is an action that automatically approves and merges dependabot pull requests (PRs). Prior to version 3.2.0, github-action-merge-dependabot does not check if a commit created by dependabot is verified with the proper GPG key. There is just a check if the actor is set to dependabot[bot] to determine if the PR is a legit PR. Theoretically, an owner of a seemingly valid and legit action in the pipeline can check if the PR is created by dependabot and if their own action has enough permissions to modify the PR in the pipeline. If so, they can modify the PR by adding a second seemingly valid and legit commit to the PR, as they can set arbitrarily the username and email in for commits in git. Because the bot only checks if the actor is valid, it would pass the malicious changes through and merge the PR automatically, without getting noticed by project maintainers. It would probably not be possible to determine where the malicious commit came from, as it would only say dependabot[bot] and the corresponding email-address. Version 3.2.0 contains a patch for this issue.