A symlink following vulnerability was found in the ABRT post-create event handler scripts in /etc/libreport/events.d/abrtevent.conf. Event scripts write output files using shell redirections (e.g., "printf ... > $DUMPDIR/varlogmessages") which use open() with OWRONLY|OCREAT|OTRUNC without the ONOFOLLOW flag. If the target file is replaced with a symlink, the shell process (running as root in the abrthandleeventt SELinux domain, which is effectively unconfined) follows the symlink and writes content to the symlink target. In contrast, ddsavetext (used by SetElement) correctly uses ONOFOLLOW. An attacker who has gained filesystem control of the dump directory can replace output files with symlinks pointing to sensitive system files such as /var/spool/cron/root.

A flaw was found in libinput. A local attacker who can place a specially crafted Lua bytecode file in certain system or user configuration directories can bypass security restrictions. This allows the attacker to run unauthorized code with the same permissions as the program using libinput, such as a graphical compositor. This could lead to the attacker monitoring keyboard input and sending that information to an external location.