Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
2.1
AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, gh attestation verify  builds the certificate Subject Alternative Name matcher from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow  flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a user-supplied repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. Because GitHub permits characters such as  .  in organization, repository, and workflow path names and  .  is a regex wildcard, an attacker can register a lookalike name (for example github/artifact.attestations-workflows) that satisfies a matcher intended for a different trusted signer (github/artifact-attestations-workflows), bypassing the intended Sigstore attestation verification. Exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository and produce valid attestations from it, which could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that pin trust to a specific signing workflow. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

First published (updated )
Severity
5.1
Path Traversal
AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub’s official command line tool. Prior to 2.97.0, some HTTP request URLs interpolate variable path components without percent encoding, allowing URL path metacharacters in attacker-controlled repository or resource values to make gh address a different API endpoint or resource than the user intended. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

First published (updated )
Severity
3.3
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

GitHub CLI (gh) is GitHub's official command line tool. Prior to version 2.97.0, gh auth status masked only the characters after the last underscore in certain fine-grained personal access tokens and GitHub App tokens. As a result, part of an affected token could appear in terminal or CI output that is captured or shared. Authenticated users are affected if they ran gh auth status (without the --show-token flag) with a token type whose format contains an underscore after the prefix. This includes fine-grained personal access tokens (githubpat) and GitHub App installation and user access tokens (ghs, ghu; for example, ghs<APPID><JWT>), as well as the Actions GITHUBTOKEN. Classic tokens such as gho and ghp have an underscore-free body and are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 2.97.0.

First published (updated )
Severity
3.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

Summary

A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow terminal escape sequence injection when users view GitHub Actions workflow logs using gh run view --log or gh run view --log-failed.

Details

The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles raw Actions log output. The gh run view --log and gh run view --log-failed commands stream workflow log lines to stdout or the configured pager without sanitizing terminal control sequences. An attacker who can influence GitHub Actions log content, for example via a PR triggered workflow, can embed escape sequences that are replayed in the user's terminal when they inspect the run.

Depending on the victim's terminal emulator, injected sequences could change the window title, manipulate on screen content, or in some terminal emulators (such as screen) potentially execute arbitrary commands.

In 2.92.0, GitHub CLI sanitizes terminal control sequences in Actions log output before writing to the terminal.

PoC

Create a workflow that emits terminal escape sequences in its log output:

yaml name: Escape Sequence PoC

on: workflowdispatch:

jobs: emit-escape-sequences: runs-on: ubuntu-latest steps: - name: Emit terminal escape sequences run: | # OSC title set printf 'ESCAPEMARKERSTART \033]0;HIJACKEDTITLE\007 ESCAPEMARKEREND\n' # CSI color printf 'ESCAPEMARKERSTART \033[31mREDTEXT\033[0m ESCAPEMARKEREND\n' # Screen title set (enables command execution in screen terminal) printf 'ESCAPEMARKERSTART \033k;malicious command;\033\\ ESCAPEMARKEREND\n'

Then trigger the workflow and view its logs:

bash gh workflow run 'Escape Sequence PoC' gh run view <runid> --log

On vulnerable versions, the raw ESC bytes (0x1b) are passed through to the terminal unsanitized. On 2.92.0 and later, escape sequences are stripped and only the safe visible text is displayed.

Impact

An attacker who can control GitHub Actions workflow output can inject terminal escape sequences into a maintainer's terminal session when they inspect the run with gh run view --log or gh run view --log-failed. The practical impact depends on the victim's terminal emulator.

Remediation and Mitigation

1. Upgrade gh to 2.92.0 2. Pipe log output through a sanitizer (e.g., gh run view --log | cat -v) as a workaround on older versions 3. Exercise caution when viewing logs from untrusted workflow runs

1 / 3
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
3.5
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

gh is GitHub’s official command line tool. From 1.6.0 to before 2.92.0, a security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow terminal escape sequence injection when users view GitHub Actions workflow logs using gh run view --log or gh run view --log-failed. The vulnerability stems from the way GitHub CLI handles raw Actions log output. The gh run view --log and gh run view --log-failed commands stream workflow log lines to stdout or the configured pager without sanitizing terminal control sequences. An attacker who can influence GitHub Actions log content, for example via a PR triggered workflow, can embed escape sequences that are replayed in the user's terminal when they inspect the run. Depending on the victim's terminal emulator, injected sequences could change the window title, manipulate on screen content, or in some terminal emulators (such as screen) potentially execute arbitrary commands. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.92.0.

First published (updated )

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