An issue was discovered in GNOME file-roller before 3.29.91. It allows a single ./../ path traversal via a filename contained in a TAR archive, possibly overwriting a file during extraction.

A stack-based buffer overflow exists in file-roller's parseprogressline() functions in the 7z and RAR archive backends (src/fr-command-7z.c and src/fr-command-rar.c). When processing output from the 7z or rar subprocess, file paths from archive entries are copied with strcpy() into fixed-size stack buffers (4196 and 4096 bytes) without length validation. An archive containing a file entry with a path longer than these buffers causes a stack buffer overflow when the user opens or extracts the archive in file-roller, resulting in denial of service (process termination). Practical code execution is considered difficult on hardened builds with stack canaries, PIE, and ASLR.

Reported upstream as https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/file-roller/-/issues/327 by Yukihiro Nakamura. Fixed upstream in commit ffb76dc866342cef6a4914873faaa880d14d5aa4 ("Check line length when parsing command output"), first released in file-roller 44.7.

fr-archive-libarchive.c in GNOME file-roller through 3.36.1 allows Directory Traversal during extraction because it lacks a check of whether a file's parent is a symlink to a directory outside of the intended extraction location.