Integer signedness error in the elfgetdynamicinfo function in elf/dynamic-link.h in ld.so in the GNU C Library (aka glibc or libc6) 2.0.1 through 2.11.1, when the --verify option is used, allows user-assisted remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted ELF program with a negative value for a certain dtag structure member in the ELF header.

Stack consumption vulnerability in the regcomp implementation in the GNU C Library (aka glibc or libc6) through 2.11.3, and 2.12.x through 2.12.2, allows context-dependent attackers to cause a denial of service (resource exhaustion) via a regular expression containing adjacent repetition operators, as demonstrated by a {10,}{10,}{10,}{10,} sequence in the proftpd.gnu.c exploit for ProFTPD.

Maksymilian Arciemowicz reported a deficiency in the way glibc regular expression engine processed certain patterns. A local attacker could use this flaw to cause a denial of service (crash due stack overflow).

Note: The above described behavior is a limitation of glibc regular expression engine. Regular expression matching function is called recursively for certain types of patterns (where subexpression using quantifier is nested inside of another quantified expression), where long input can result in deep recursion and exhaustion of all stack memory (i.e. impact is limited to crash). Amount of stack memory available to glibc regular expression engine influences the size of input that must be provided to trigger the crash. Alternatively, expression can be modified to avoid quantification nesting, or program modified to limit size of input passed to regular expression engine.

Conclusion: Due the above described behavior Red Hat Security Response Team would not classify this deficiency to be a security issue.

References: [1] http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/912279 [2] http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/515589 [3] http://forums.cnet.com/7726-6132102-5042238.html [4] http://secunia.com/advisories/42547/ [5] http://securityreason.com/securityalert/8003

A security flaw was found in the way strcoll() interface of glibc, the GNU libc libraries, performed failsafe back to alloca() routine when malloc() function call failed previously (due to out of memory [OOM] condition for example). If an application linked against glibc was missing an application-level sanity checks for validity of strcoll() arguments and accepted untrusted input, an attacker could use this flaw to cause the particular application to crash or, potentially, execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running the application.

Upstream bug report (including the reproducer): [1] http://sourceware.org/bugzilla/showbug.cgi?id=14552#c0

Issue / part: 1) alloca() stack overflow from [1].

References: [2] http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/09/07/9 [3] http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/09/07/15 [4] http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/09/10/1 [5] http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/09/10/3 [6] http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2012/09/13/16