Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
5.3
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Summary The openapi3filter.ValidationHandler (the exported, documented request-validation middleware) hard-wires the legacy router (routers/legacy). That router matches the incoming request method verbatim against a trie built exclusively from upper-cased canonical HTTP methods. A request carrying a method token that is not one of the 9 standard methods — a legitimate-but-unsupported token such as PROPFIND, or a non-canonical case variant such as lowercase get — misses the trie, leaves route == nil, and for an existing static path falls through to PathItem.GetOperation(method), whose default: case calls panic(...). The panic fires inside route resolution, before any authentication runs. This is an unauthenticated, remotely triggerable denial of service (recovered per-connection panic + unbounded error-log growth).

Root Cause - openapi3filter/validationhandler.go:39 — ValidationHandler.Load() always constructs legacyrouter.NewRouter(doc); there is no alternative router option on this path. - routers/legacy/router.go:109 — the request method is used verbatim (method, url := req.Method, ...); there is no canonicalization or rejection of unknown method tokens. - routers/legacy/router.go:69-70 — the trie is populated with strings.ToUpper(method) keys taken from pathItem.Operations() (canonical http.Method constants only). - routers/legacy/router.go:141 — root.Match(method + " " + remainingPath) misses for a non-canonical/unsupported method → route == nil. - routers/legacy/router.go:146-150 — in the route == nil block, doc.Paths.Value(path) returns non-nil for an existing static path, and control reaches pathItem.GetOperation(method). - openapi3/pathitem.go:174 — GetOperation's switch method has no matching case → default: panic(fmt.Errorf("unsupported HTTP method %q", method)).

Impact An unauthenticated attacker sends a single request with a non-standard HTTP method token to any existing static path. The handler goroutine panics; Go's net/http recovers the panic per connection (process survives), aborts the connection (client sees a reset / 500), and logs a full stack trace. Repeated requests cause connection churn and unbounded http: panic serving log growth, and the request never reaches authentication. Availability impact (A:L) under the default synchronous ValidationHandler middleware; on non-net/http hosts or when reached on an application goroutine the ceiling is a full crash.

Proof of Concept Serve any spec with a static path (e.g. /ping) behind openapi3filter.ValidationHandler, then: printf 'PROPFIND /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc target 8080 # connection aborted (panic) printf 'get /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc target 8080 # connection aborted (panic) printf 'GET /ping HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: x\r\n\r\n' | nc target 8080 # 200 OK (process survived) Reproduced end-to-end against a real net/http.Server + ValidationHandler: PROPFIND /ping and lowercase get /ping both abort the connection with a panic at pathitem.go:174 (stack: GetOperation <- legacy.FindRoute router.go:150 <- ValidationHandler.validateRequest validationhandler.go:84); the process stays alive and subsequent GET /ping returns 200.

Attack Chain 1. Entry: unauthenticated PROPFIND /ping HTTP/1.1 (any known static path). Guard: net/http method validation. Bypass proof: net/http accepts any valid HTTP token as a method — PROPFIND and lowercase get both reach the handler. 2. Route match: legacy/router.go:141 root.Match("PROPFIND /ping"). Guard: trie match. Bypass proof: trie holds only upper-cased canonical methods → miss → route == nil. 3. route == nil block: router.go:146 doc.Paths.Value("/ping") → non-nil for an existing static path (exact map lookup). Guard: pathItem == nil check (l.147). Bypass proof: static path exists → not nil → proceeds. 4. Sink: router.go:150 pathItem.GetOperation("PROPFIND") → pathitem.go:174 default: panic(...). 5. Impact: handler goroutine panics; net/http recovers per connection; request never reaches auth.

Bypass Evidence - net/http does NOT reject non-standard method tokens — confirmed empirically: PROPFIND and lowercase get both reached the handler and panicked. - No canonicalization/rejection exists between FindRoute entry and GetOperation; req.Method is used verbatim (router.go:109). - git show v0.144.0:openapi3/pathitem.go shows panic(...) at line 174; git show v0.144.0:routers/legacy/router.go shows verbatim method use and the unguarded GetOperation call. git log v0.144.0..HEAD on these files is empty (no post-tag fix).

Scoping Note The panic requires the request path to be an exact static (non-templated) key in the served spec. A concrete path against a /{id} template returns a clean 500 (not a panic), because Paths.Value is an exact map lookup. Static paths (/health, /login, /version, /metrics, /ping, /) are ubiquitous in real specs and discoverable from public specs/standard endpoints, so a vulnerable target almost always exists. This makes the finding arguably broader than existing panic advisories, as it needs no special spec construct — any static path suffices.

Affected Versions <= 0.144.0 (present on the latest release tag v0.144.0; long-standing; no patched version).

Suggested Fix In the legacy router, canonicalize/validate the request method before route resolution and return ErrMethodNotAllowed/ErrPathNotFound for unknown methods, or make PathItem.GetOperation return an error (nil) for unrecognized methods instead of calling panic.

--- Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203