Where
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.1
Input Validation
AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

In github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11/v2 versions <= 2.0.0-rc8 (and the deprecated v1 module paths github.com/eclipse-keypont/crypto11 <= 1.6.8, github.com/ThalesGroup/crypto11 <= 1.7.0-rc1 and github.com/ThalesIgnite/crypto11 <= 1.2.5), the cipher.AEAD returned by SecretKey.NewGCM() passes whatever nonce it is given straight to CKGCMPARAMS without checking its length against NonceSize(), and accepts an empty nonce. On a token that accepts a zero-length GCM IV — SoftHSM2 does — every Seal with an empty nonce encrypts under the same IV, reusing the keystream and exposing the GHASH authentication key, which allows forgeries. Separately, Config.UseGCMIVFromHSM sends a NULL IV with length zero to the token unless GCMIVFromHSMControl.SupplyIvForHSMGCMEncrypt is also set, so the token has nowhere to write the IV it generates: a Seal with a non-empty nonce panics after the plaintext has already been encrypted, and a Seal with an empty nonce returns ciphertext under an empty IV without error. On the v1 line HSM-IV mode additionally never copies the token-generated IV back to the caller, so the caller keeps its own nonce while the data was encrypted under another one.

First published (updated )

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