Chromium: CVE-2024-4671 Use after free in Visuals
Palo Alto Networks incorporated the following Chromium security fixes into our products:
https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/10/stable-channel-update-for-desktop28.html
Accessibility. A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.
Accessibility. A privacy issue was addressed by removing sensitive data.
Chromium: CVE-2026-2441 Use after free in CSS
In ParsePayloads of AudioSdpParser.cpp, there is a possible memory corruption due to type confusion. This could lead to remote code execution with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
Data race in audio in Google Chrome prior to 89.0.4389.72 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page.
Chromium: CVE-2023-1531 Use after free in ANGLE
Palo Alto Networks incorporated the following Chromium security fixes into our products:
https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/06/extended-stable-updates-for-desktop.html https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/06/extended-stable-updates-for-desktop.html https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/06/extended-stable-updates-for-desktop.htmlhttps://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/06/extended-stable-updates-for-desktop.html https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/06/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/05/extended-stable-updates-for-desktop.html https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/05/stable-channel-update-for-desktop27.html https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/05/stable-channel-update-for-desktop14.html
Additionally, a vulnerability in Prisma Browser was also addressed.
Palo Alto Networks incorporated the following Chromium security fixes into our products:
https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2025/10/stable-channel-update-for-desktop28.html
The Fonts implementation in Google Chrome before 40.0.2214.91 does not initialize memory for a data structure, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.
Google Chromium contains an information disclosure vulnerability within the core memory component that allows a remote attacker to obtain potentially sensitive information from process memory via a crafted HTML page. This vulnerability could affect multiple web browsers that utilize Chromium, including, but not limited to, Google Chrome, Microsoft Edge, and Opera.
The SelectionOwner::ProcessTarget function in ui/base/x/selectionowner.cc in the UI implementation in Google Chrome before 40.0.2214.91 uses an incorrect data type for a certain length value, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via crafted X11 data.
Skia, as used in Google Chrome before 40.0.2214.91, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via unspecified vectors.
Chromium: CVE-2025-4664 Insufficient policy enforcement in Loader
Out of bounds read in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 133.0.6943.141 allowed a remote attacker to potentially exploit heap corruption via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium)
Google Chrome before 40.0.2214.91, when the Harmony proxy in Google V8 is enabled, allows remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy via crafted JavaScript code with Proxy.create and console.log calls, related to HTTP responses that lack an "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff" header.
On Tue, 19 May 2026 at 19:30:42 -0400, Aaron Rainbolt wrote: I wonder if it would be worth proposing a change to whatever system component handles opening files (probably something in Glib, or xdg-utils, haven't researched that deeply yet)
GLib, and via that, gio(1), xdg-desktop-portal and flatpak-xdg-utils' xdg-open(1) reimplementation some Qt/KDE library (I'm less familiar with the KDE world, so I don't know whether this is done in the Qt layer or somewhere in kdelibs) xdg-utils' xdg-open(1) (the reference implementation of that name) Debian's mailcap package, which translates fd.o MIME handlers into traditional mailcap(5) handlers web browsers like Firefox and Chromium might reimplement it? not sure ...
so that handlers cannot be registered for certain "dangerous" file types (i.e. ELF/PE/Mach-O executables, scripts in various languages, etc.)? The only real downside I can see to that is the inability to text editors to register themselves as handlers for script MIME types, and in those instances, the editor can register itself as the handler for another applicable, more generic MIME type (i.e. text/plain), then change its behavior based on the more detailed MIME type of the file after it opens it.
smcv
On 5/20/26 05:51, Simon McVittie wrote: On Tue, 19 May 2026 at 19:30:42 -0400, Aaron Rainbolt wrote: I wonder if it would be worth proposing a change to whatever system component handles opening files (probably something in Glib, or xdg-utils, haven't researched that deeply yet) It's a general-purpose specification that is designed to be implemented by an unlimited number of packages, some of them desktop-specific:
GLib, and via that, gio(1), xdg-desktop-portal and flatpak-xdg-utils' xdg-open(1) reimplementation some Qt/KDE library (I'm less familiar with the KDE world, so I don't know whether this is done in the Qt layer or somewhere in kdelibs) xdg-utils' xdg-open(1) (the reference implementation of that name) Debian's mailcap package, which translates fd.o MIME handlers into traditional mailcap(5) handlers web browsers like Firefox and Chromium might reimplement it? not sure ...
so any change to how the spec is to be implemented would have to be fd.o consensus and spread across all of those. Honestly, I think the open-ended nature makes it inherently insecure.
Sandboxes should only allow allowlist of file types and make everything else fall back to a safe default. This could be a simple text editor (no IDE support!) for text files, and a hex editor (or an error) for binary files. -- Sincerely, Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers)