When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.

Using the $timeGroup macro, one can achieve an OOM by overloading the server. This requires a SQL datasource. If the server is set up to auto-restart, the impact is minimal or non-existent, as the attack can take upwards of half an hour to crash the server.

The Grafana Live push endpoint can be exploited to cause unbounded memory allocation by sending a large or streaming request body, potentially leading to out-of-memory conditions. An authenticated user with access to the Grafana Live API can trigger this issue.

Any Editor could delete any snapshot, even if they have no access to read or write them.

Editors could delete any annotation, even those they do not have read access to. The editor user cannot create or read the annotations.

An Editor can overwrite a dashboard not owned by them to acquire admin on that specific dashboard. The user must have write access to the dashboard to escalate privilege.

A race condition in Grafana Live allows authenticated users with Viewer role to trigger a server crash by sending concurrent requests that cause a fatal map access error. This results in complete service unavailability requiring restart of the Grafana server.

A request to the Grafana plugin resources endpoint can cause unbounded memory allocation by reading the entire request body into memory. An authenticated user can exploit this to trigger an out-of-memory condition, potentially causing a denial of service.