The dashboard permissions API does not verify the target dashboard scope and only checks the dashboards.permissions: action. As a result, a user who has permission management rights on one dashboard can read and modify permissions on other dashboards. This is an organization‑internal privilege escalation.

When a user's access to mint tokens for a service account is revoked, it is sometimes still possible to do so for a few seconds after the event. The user will eventually lose access to do this.

Every uncached /avatar/:hash request spawns a goroutine that refreshes the Gravatar image. If the refresh sits in the 10-slot worker queue longer than three seconds, the handler times out and stops listening for the result, so that goroutine blocks forever trying to send on an unbuffered channel. Sustained traffic with random hashes keeps tripping this timeout, so goroutine count grows linearly, eventually exhausting memory and causing Grafana to crash on some systems.

The public dashboard query endpoint does not limit request body size before processing, allowing unauthenticated attackers to trigger excessive memory allocation by sending arbitrarily large JSON payloads. This can lead to denial of service through memory exhaustion. No valid dashboard access token or authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.

An unauthenticated attacker can repeatedly call Grafana's OAuth login route with unique values, causing unbounded memory growth that can eventually exhaust memory and crash the Grafana instance (denial of service).

Several Grafana API endpoints, some of them unauthenticated, do not limit the size of the request body before processing it. An attacker can send very large payloads that force excessive memory allocation, potentially exhausting memory and causing a denial of service.

When using an IPv6 allow-list for the Auth Proxy feature, it defaults to /32 addresses. Addresses specifying a mask explicitly are not affected; to mitigate easily, add the desired mask (usually /128) to the addresses. Only auth proxy is affected; Okta, SAML, LDAP, etc are unaffected here.

An Editor can overwrite a dashboard not owned by them to acquire admin on that specific dashboard. The user must have write access to the dashboard to escalate privilege.

Stack traces in Grafana's Explore Traces view can be rendered as raw HTML, and thus inject malicious JavaScript in the browser. This would require malicious JavaScript to be entered into the stack trace field.

Only datasources with the Jaeger HTTP API appear to be affected; Jaeger gRPC and Tempo do not appear affected whatsoever.

The Grafana MSSQL data source plugin contains a logic flaw that allows a low-privileged user (Viewer) to bypass API restrictions and trigger a catastrophic Out-Of-Memory (OOM) memory exhaustion, crashing the host container.

Any Editor could delete any snapshot, even if they have no access to read or write them.

Using the $timeGroup macro, one can achieve an OOM by overloading the server. This requires a SQL datasource. If the server is set up to auto-restart, the impact is minimal or non-existent, as the attack can take upwards of half an hour to crash the server.

A request to the Grafana plugin resources endpoint can cause unbounded memory allocation by reading the entire request body into memory. An authenticated user can exploit this to trigger an out-of-memory condition, potentially causing a denial of service.

The Grafana Live push endpoint can be exploited to cause unbounded memory allocation by sending a large or streaming request body, potentially leading to out-of-memory conditions. An authenticated user with access to the Grafana Live API can trigger this issue.

A race condition in Grafana Live allows authenticated users with Viewer role to trigger a server crash by sending concurrent requests that cause a fatal map access error. This results in complete service unavailability requiring restart of the Grafana server.

A vulnerability in SQL Expressions allows an authenticated attacker to read arbitrary files from the Grafana server's filesystem. Only instances with the sqlExpressions feature toggle enabled are vulnerable.

Public dashboards with annotations enabled did not limit their annotation timerange to the locked timerange of the public dashboard. This means one could read the entire history of annotations visible on the specific dashboard, even those outside the locked timerange.

This did not leak any annotations that would not otherwise be visible on the public dashboard.

Editors could delete any annotation, even those they do not have read access to. The editor user cannot create or read the annotations.

A cross-tenant isolation vulnerability was found in Grafana’s Correlations feature affecting legacy correlation records. Due to a backward compatibility condition allowing orgid = 0 records to be returned across organizations, a user with datasource management privileges could read and permanently delete legacy correlation data belonging to another organization. This issue affects correlations created prior to Grafana 10.2 and is fixed in >=11.6.11, >=12.0.9, >=12.1.6, and >=12.2.4.

Thanks to Gyu-hyeok Lee (g2h) for reporting this vulnerability.

The public dashboard deletion endpoint does not enforce organization isolation, allowing an Org Admin in one organization to delete public dashboards belonging to a different organization by supplying the target dashboard's identifiers.

In Grafana's alerting system, users with edit permissions for a contact point, specifically the permissions “alert.notifications:write” or “alert.notifications.receivers:test” that are granted as part of the fixed role "Contact Point Writer", which is part of the basic role Editor - can edit contact points created by other users, modify the endpoint URL to a controlled server. By invoking the test functionality, attackers can capture and extract redacted secure settings, such as authentication credentials for third-party services (e.g., Slack tokens). This leads to unauthorized access and potential compromise of external integrations.