The Grav API plugin (grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.4 does not validate the origin of the client-supplied adminbaseurl field in the POST /api/v1/auth/forgot-password endpoint. The sanitizeHttpUrl() function only checks that the URL scheme is http/https and never verifies the host against the server's own origin, so an attacker can supply an arbitrary host. As a result, an unauthenticated attacker can cause the password reset email sent to a victim to contain a reset link pointing at an attacker-controlled server; when the victim follows the link, the valid reset token is disclosed to the attacker, enabling full account takeover. The vulnerable base URL can also be influenced via the Referer or Origin headers.

grav-plugin-api before 1.0.6 fails to validate super-admin status in createApiKey, generate2fa, and disable2fa endpoints, allowing non-super api.users.write managers to escalate to super-admin. Attackers can mint API keys bound to super-admin accounts or strip 2FA from super-admin users to achieve full instance takeover.

The Grav api plugin (grav-plugin-api) before 1.0.8 fails to properly authorize API key generation and revocation: the plugin intercepts the apiKeyGenerate/apiKeyRevoke admin tasks before the account-management ACL runs and authorizes the caller on only the admin.login permission (the baseline permission held by every panel user). This allows any user with admin.login to mint a persistent API key bound to any account, and the forged key inherits the target account's API permissions. On installs where an API-enabled account holds broader permissions, this enables account impersonation and privilege escalation up to account takeover.

grav-plugin-api versions before 1.0.15 fail to validate Twig content in the translate() endpoint, allowing attackers with api.pages.write permission to persist pages with process.twig enabled. Attackers can submit crafted header and content parameters to execute server-side template injection payloads that are evaluated at render time.