Use of Password Hash With Insufficient Computational Effort vulnerability in danielberkompas cloakecto and danielberkompas cloak allows an attacker who holds the hashed values and the configured secret to brute-force low-entropy plaintexts much faster than configured.

The dump/1 callback that Cloak.Ecto.PBKDF2 (Cloak.Fields.PBKDF2 in cloak before the Ecto code moved to cloakecto) injects into a field module calls :pbkdf2.pbkdf2/4 with config[:size] in the iteration-count position. The :iterations setting is validated but never used. With the cloakecto defaults (iterations: 600000, size: 32) each hash runs 32 PBKDF2 rounds instead of 600,000, so offline guessing of values such as email addresses costs about 18,750 times less than configured.

This issue affects cloakecto: from 1.0.0-alpha.0 onward; cloak: from 0.7.0 before 1.0.0-alpha.0.

Reliance on Obfuscation or Encryption of Security-Relevant Inputs without Integrity Checking vulnerability in danielberkompas cloak allows an attacker with write access to stored ciphertext to make it decrypt to a chosen value via bit flipping.

Cloak.Ciphers.AES.CTR encrypts with AES-256 in CTR mode and stores the key tag, the IV and the ciphertext with no MAC. decrypt/2 checks only the key tag and the minimum length before it returns the plaintext, and Cloak.Ciphers.Deprecated.AES.CTR decrypts the legacy format the same way. CTR is a stream cipher, so a value XORed into the stored ciphertext is XORed into the plaintext at the same offset. An attacker who can write to the encrypted store (for example through SQL injection or a compromised replica) and who knows or can guess a stored plaintext can replace it with any value of the same length. The application receives that value with no error.

This issue affects cloak: from 0.1.0-pre onward.