Summary
A path traversal issue in toSSG() allows files to be written outside the configured output directory during static site generation. When using dynamic route parameters via ssgParams, specially crafted values can cause generated file paths to escape the intended output directory.
Details
The static site generation process creates output files based on route paths derived from application routes and parameters. When ssgParams is used to provide values for dynamic routes, those values are used to construct output file paths. If these values contain traversal sequences (e.g. ..), the resulting output path may resolve outside the configured output directory. As a result, files may be written to unintended locations instead of being confined within the specified output directory.
For example: ts import { Hono } from 'hono' import { toSSG, ssgParams } from 'hono/ssg'
const app = new Hono()
app.get('/:id', ssgParams([{ id: '../pwned' }]), (c) => { return c.text('pwned') })
toSSG(app, fs, { dir: './static' })
In this case, the generated output path may resolve outside ./static, resulting in a file being written outside the intended output directory.
Impact
An attacker who can influence values passed to ssgParams during the build process may be able to write files outside the intended output directory.
Depending on the build and deployment environment, this may:
overwrite unintended files affect generated artifacts impact deployment outputs or downstream tooling
This issue is limited to build-time static site generation and does not affect request-time routing.
Summary
cx() in hono/css composes class names from plain strings but marks the result as already-escaped without HTML-escaping the input. When the result is used as a JSX class attribute during server-side rendering, the value is written into the attribute unescaped, so untrusted input can break out of the class attribute and inject arbitrary markup, leading to Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
Details
Because the composed value is treated as pre-escaped, the HTML attribute escaping normally applied to interpolated values is skipped, and characters such as " pass through unescaped — allowing a value to terminate the attribute and add further attributes or elements. This arises when an application passes untrusted, user-controlled input as a class name to cx(), for example when merging a base class with an externally provided className.
Impact
During server-side rendering, an attacker who controls a value passed to cx() can inject arbitrary HTML into the page, resulting in stored or reflected XSS in the victim's browser.
This may lead to:
- Execution of attacker-controlled script in the victim's browser session. - Session hijacking, credential theft, or actions performed on behalf of the victim.
Applications are affected only if they render JSX server-side and pass untrusted input as a class name to cx().