Where
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N

IBM Db2 Genius Hub 1.1, 1.1.1, 1.1.2 and IBM Agentics 1.0 could allow an attacker to execute arbitrary code or obtain sensitive information due to the use of dangerous functions without sufficient restrictions.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
10
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L

Previously, CVE-2024-45337 fixed an authorization bypass for misused ssh server configurations; if any other type of callback is passed other than public key, then the source-address validation would be skipped.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
Buffer Overflow
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H/E:U

A malicious SSH peer could send unsolicited global request responses to fill an internal buffer, blocking the connection's read loop. The blocked goroutine could not be released by calling Close(), resulting in a resource leak per connection. Unsolicited global responses are now discarded.

1 / 3
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/E:U

Invoking auth bypass via unenforced @revoked status in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/knownhosts

1 / 3
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
Integer Overflow
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

Invoking infinite loop on large channel writes in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh

1 / 3
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
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Severity
9.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

The Verify() method for FIDO/U2F security key types (sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256, sk-ssh-ed25519) did not check the User Presence flag. Signatures generated without physical touch were accepted, allowing unattended use of a hardware security key. To restore the previous behavior, return a "no-touch-required" extension in Permissions.Extensions from PublicKeyCallback.

1 / 2
Source: Red Hat
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Invoking key constraints not enforced in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent

1 / 3
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N/E:U

Invoking agent constraints dropped when forwarding keys in golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/agent

1 / 3
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
Severity
10
SSRF, CRLF Injection
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

Vulnerability Disclosure: Unrestricted Cloud Metadata Exfiltration via Header Injection Chain

Summary The Axios library is vulnerable to a specific "Gadget" attack chain that allows Prototype Pollution in any third-party dependency to be escalated into Remote Code Execution (RCE) or Full Cloud Compromise (via AWS IMDSv2 bypass).

While Axios patches exist for preventing check pollution, the library remains vulnerable to being used as a gadget when pollution occurs elsewhere. This is due to a lack of HTTP Header Sanitization (CWE-113) combined with default SSRF capabilities.

Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.9) Affected Versions: All versions (v0.x - v1.x) Vulnerable Component: lib/adapters/http.js (Header Processing)

Usage of "Helper" Vulnerabilities This vulnerability is unique because it requires Zero Direct User Input. If an attacker can pollute Object.prototype via any other library in the stack (e.g., qs, minimist, ini, body-parser), Axios will automatically pick up the polluted properties during its config merge.

Because Axios does not sanitise these merged header values for CRLF (\r\n) characters, the polluted property becomes a Request Smuggling payload.

Proof of Concept

1. The Setup (Simulated Pollution) Imagine a scenario where a known vulnerability exists in a query parser. The attacker sends a payload that sets: javascript Object.prototype['x-amz-target'] = "dummy\r\n\r\nPUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: 169.254.169.254\r\nX-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600\r\n\r\nGET /ignore";

2. The Gadget Trigger (Safe Code) The application makes a completely safe, hardcoded request: javascript // This looks safe to the developer await axios.get('https://analytics.internal/pings');

3. The Execution Axios merges the prototype property x-amz-target into the request headers. It then writes the header value directly to the socket without validation.

Resulting HTTP traffic: http GET /pings HTTP/1.1 Host: analytics.internal x-amz-target: dummy

PUT /latest/api/token HTTP/1.1 Host: 169.254.169.254 X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds: 21600

GET /ignore HTTP/1.1 ...

4. The Impact (IMDSv2 Bypass) The "Smuggled" second request is a valid PUT request to the AWS Metadata Service. It includes the required X-aws-ec2-metadata-token-ttl-seconds header (which a normal SSRF cannot send). The Metadata Service returns a session token, allowing the attacker to steal IAM credentials and compromise the cloud account.

Impact Analysis - Security Control Bypass: Defeats AWS IMDSv2 (Session Tokens). - Authentication Bypass: Can inject headers (Cookie, Authorization) to pivot into internal administrative panels. - Cache Poisoning: Can inject Host headers to poison shared caches.

Recommended Fix Validate all header values in lib/adapters/http.js and xhr.js before passing them to the underlying request function.

Patch Suggestion: javascript // In lib/adapters/http.js utils.forEach(requestHeaders, function setRequestHeader(val, key) { if (/[\r\n]/.test(val)) { throw new Error('Security: Header value contains invalid characters'); } // ... proceed to set header });

References - OWASP: CRLF Injection (CWE-113)

This report was generated as part of a security audit of the Axios library.

1 / 5
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
EPSS
0.09%
Code Injection
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Impact

The fix for CVE-2021-23337 added validation for the variable option in .template but did not apply the same validation to options.imports key names. Both paths flow into the same Function() constructor sink.

When an application passes untrusted input as options.imports key names, an attacker can inject default-parameter expressions that execute arbitrary code at template compilation time.

Additionally, .template uses assignInWith to merge imports, which enumerates inherited properties via for..in. If Object.prototype has been polluted by any other vector, the polluted keys are copied into the imports object and passed to Function().

Patches

Users should upgrade to version 4.18.0.

The fix applies two changes: 1. Validate importsKeys against the existing reForbiddenIdentifierChars regex (same check already used for the variable option) 2. Replace assignInWith with assignWith when merging imports, so only own properties are enumerated

Workarounds

Do not pass untrusted input as key names in options.imports. Only use developer-controlled, static key names.

1 / 6
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )
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Severity
9.8
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Certifi 2023.07.22 removes root certificates from "e-Tugra" from the root store. These are in the process of being removed from Mozilla's trust store.

e-Tugra's root certificates are being removed pursuant to an investigation prompted by reporting of security issues in their systems. Conclusions of Mozilla's investigation can be found here.

1 / 4
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

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