libexpat is vulnerable to a denial of service, caused by an XML entity expansion flaw if XMLDTD is undefined at compile time. By compiling specially crafted XML input, a local attacker could exploit this vulnerability to cause a denial of service.

Summary

Records in DNS replies are not checked for their relevance to the query, allowing an attacker to respond with RRs from different zones.

Details

DNS Messages are not authenticated. They do not guarantee that

- received RRs are authentic - not received RRs do not exist - all or any received records in a response relate to the request

Applications utilizing DNSSEC generally expect these guarantees to be met, however DNSSEC by itself only guarantees the first two. To meet the third guarantee, resolvers generally follow an (undocumented, as far as RFCs go) algorithm such as: (simplified, e.g. lacks DNSSEC validation!)

1. denote by QNAME the name you are querying (e.g. fraunhofer.de.), and initialize a list of aliases 2. if the ANSWER section contains a valid PTR RRSet for QNAME, return it (and optionally return the list of aliases as well) 3. if the ANSWER section contains a valid CNAME RRSet for QNAME, add it to the list of aliases. Set QNAME to the CNAME's target and go to 2. 4. Verify that QNAME does not have any PTR, CNAME and DNAME records using valid NSEC or NSEC3 records. Return null.

Note that this algorithm relies on NSEC records and thus requires a considerable portion of the DNSSEC specifications to be implemented. For this reason, it cannot be performed by a DNS client (aka application) and is typically performed as part of the resolver logic.

dnsjava does not implement a comparable algorithm, and the provided APIs instead return either

- the received DNS message itself (e.g. when using a ValidatingResolver such as in this example), or - essentially just the contents of its ANSWER section (e.g. when using a LookupSession such as in this example)

If applications blindly filter the received results for RRs of the desired record type (as seems to be typical usage for dnsjava), a rogue recursive resolver or (on UDP/TCP connections) a network attacker can

- In addition to the actual DNS response, add RRs irrelevant to the query but of the right datatype, e.g. from another zone, as long as that zone is correctly using DNSSEC, or - completely exchange the relevant response records

Impact

DNS(SEC) libraries are usually used as part of a larger security framework. Therefore, the main misuses of this vulnerability concern application code, which might take the returned records as authentic answers to the request. Here are three concrete examples of where this might be detrimental:

- RFC 6186 specifies that to connect to an IMAP server for a user, a mail user agent should retrieve certain SRV records and send the user's credentials to the specified servers. Exchanging the SRV records can be a tool to redirect the credentials. - When delivering mail via SMTP, MX records determine where to deliver the mails to. Exchanging the MX records might lead to information disclosure. Additionally, an exchange of TLSA records might allow attackers to intercept TLS traffic. - Some research projects like LIGHTest are trying to manage CA trust stores via URI and SMIMEA records in the DNS. Exchanging these allows manipulating the root of trust for dependent applications.

Mitigations

At this point, the following mitigations are recommended:

- When using a ValidatingResolver, ignore any Server indications of whether or not data was available (e.g. NXDOMAIN, NODATA, ...). - For APIs returning RRs from DNS responses, filter the RRs using an algorithm such as the one above. This includes e.g. LookupSession.lookupAsync. - Remove APIs dealing with raw DNS messages from the examples section or place a noticable warning above.

Impact Initializing a checkboxradio widget on an input enclosed within a label makes that parent label contents considered as the input label. If you call .checkboxradio( "refresh" ) on such a widget and the initial HTML contained encoded HTML entities, they will erroneously get decoded. This can lead to potentially executing JavaScript code.

For example, starting with the following initial secure HTML: html <label> <input id="test-input"> &lt;img src=x onerror="alert(1)"&gt; </label> and calling: js $( "#test-input" ).checkboxradio(); $( "#test-input" ).checkboxradio( "refresh" ); will turn the initial HTML into: html <label> <!-- some jQuery UI elements --> <input id="test-input"> <img src=x onerror="alert(1)"> </label> and the alert will get executed.

Patches The bug has been patched in jQuery UI 1.13.2.

Workarounds To remediate the issue, if you can change the initial HTML, you can wrap all the non-input contents of the label in a span: html <label> <input id="test-input"> <span>&lt;img src=x onerror="alert(1)"&gt;</span> </label>

References https://blog.jqueryui.com/2022/07/jquery-ui-1-13-2-released/

For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, search for a relevant issue in the jQuery UI repo. If you don't find an answer, open a new issue.

Advisory title: Field-level security issue with .keyword fields

Affected versions: OpenSearch 1.0.0-1.3.7 and 2.0.0-2.4.1

Patched versions: OpenSearch 1.3.8 and 2.5.0

Impact: There is an issue in the implementation of field-level security (FLS) and field masking where rules written to explicitly exclude fields are not correctly applied for certain queries that rely on their auto-generated .keyword fields.

This issue is only present for authenticated users with read access to the indexes containing the restricted fields.

Workaround: FLS rules that use explicit exclusions can be written to grant explicit access instead. Policies authored in this way are not subject to this issue.

Patches: OpenSearch versions 1.3.8 and 2.5.0 contain a fix for this issue.

For more information: If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact AWS/Amazon Security via our issue reporting page (https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting/) or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.

Advisory title: Issue with whitespace in JWT roles

Affected versions: OpenSearch 1.0.0-1.3.7 and 2.0.0-2.4.1

Patched versions: OpenSearch 1.3.8 and 2.5.0

Impact: OpenSearch uses JWTs to store role claims obtained from the Identity Provider (IdP) when the authentication backend is SAML or OpenID Connect. There is an issue in how those claims are processed from the JWTs where the leading and trailing whitespace is trimmed, allowing users to potentially claim roles they are not assigned to if any role matches the whitespace-stripped version of the roles they are a member of.

This issue is only present for authenticated users, and it requires either the existence of roles that match, not considering leading/trailing whitespace, or the ability for users to create said matching roles. In addition, the Identity Provider must allow leading and trailing spaces in role names.

Patches: OpenSearch versions 1.3.8 and 2.5.0 contain a fix for this issue.

For more information: If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please contact AWS/Amazon Security via our issue reporting page (https://aws.amazon.com/security/vulnerability-reporting/) or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.

Impact

Depending on network and process conditions of a fetch() request, response.arrayBuffer() might include portion of memory from the Node.js process.

Patches

This has been patched in v6.19.2.

Workarounds

There are no known workaround.

References

https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/3337 https://github.com/nodejs/undici/issues/3328 https://github.com/nodejs/undici/pull/3338 https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/f979ec3204ca489abf30e7d20e9fee9ea7711d36

Deep-merge could allow a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on the system, caused by a prototype pollution flaw in the merge methods of lodash to merge objects. By adding or modifying properties of Object.prototype using a proto or constructor payload, an attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service condition on the system.

IBM Cognos Dashboards on Cloud Pak for Data could allow a remote attacker to perform unauthorized actions due to dependency confusion.

Last updated 24 July 2024

Last updated 24 July 2024

IBM Cognos Dashboards exposes sensitive information in container images which could lead to further attacks against the system.

IBM Cognos Dashboards exposes sensitive information in environment variables which could aid in further attacks against the system.

IBM Cognos Dashboards could allow a remote attacker to bypass security restrictions, caused by a reverse tabnabbing flaw. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability and redirect a victim to a phishing site.