IBM Security Verify Governance 10.0.2 does not require that users should have strong passwords by default, which makes it easier for attackers to compromise user accounts.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mptcp: cope racing subflow creation in mptcprcvspaceadjust

Additional active subflows - i.e. created by the in kernel path manager - are included into the subflow list before starting the 3whs.

A racing recvmsg() spooling data received on an already established subflow would unconditionally call tcpcleanuprbuf() on all the current subflows, potentially hitting a divide by zero error on the newly created ones.

Explicitly check that the subflow is in a suitable state before invoking tcpcleanuprbuf().

i40e: fix race condition by adding filter's intermediate sync state

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

lib/generic-radix-tree.c: Fix rare race in genradixptralloc()

If we need to increase the tree depth, allocate a new node, and then race with another thread that increased the tree depth before us, we'll still have a preallocated node that might be used later.

If we then use that node for a new non-root node, it'll still have a pointer to the old root instead of being zeroed - fix this by zeroing it in the cmpxchg failure path.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ELF: fix kernel.randomizevaspace double read

ELF loader uses "randomizevaspace" twice. It is sysctl and can change at any moment, so 2 loads could see 2 different values in theory with unpredictable consequences.

Issue exactly one load for consistent value across one exec.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: flowtable: initialise extack before use

Fix missing initialisation of extack in flow offload.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: fix null pointer deref in bondipsecoffloadok

We must check if there is an active slave before dereferencing the pointer.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bonding: fix xfrm realdev null pointer dereference

We shouldn't set realdev to NULL because packets can be in transit and xfrm might call xdodevoffloadok() in parallel. All callbacks assume realdev is set.

Example trace: kernel: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 0000000000001030 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode kernel: #PF: errorcode(0x0002) - not-present page kernel: PGD 0 P4D 0 kernel: Oops: 0002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP kernel: CPU: 4 PID: 2237 Comm: ping Not tainted 6.7.7+ #12 kernel: Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014 kernel: RIP: 0010:nsimipsecoffloadok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim] kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bondipsecaddsaall: failed to add SA kernel: Code: e0 0f 0b 48 83 7f 38 00 74 de 0f 0b 48 8b 47 08 48 8b 37 48 8b 78 40 e9 b2 e5 9a d7 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 8b 86 80 02 00 00 <83> 80 30 10 00 00 01 b8 01 00 00 00 c3 0f 1f 80 00 00 00 00 0f 1f kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: RSP: 0018:ffffabde81553b98 EFLAGS: 00010246 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bondipsecaddsaall: failed to add SA kernel: kernel: RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9eb404e74900 RCX: ffff9eb403d97c60 kernel: RDX: ffffffffc090de10 RSI: ffff9eb404e74900 RDI: ffff9eb3c5de9e00 kernel: RBP: ffff9eb3c0a42000 R08: 0000000000000010 R09: 0000000000000014 kernel: R10: 7974203030303030 R11: 3030303030303030 R12: 0000000000000000 kernel: R13: ffff9eb3c5de9e00 R14: ffffabde81553cc8 R15: ffff9eb404c53000 kernel: FS: 00007f2a77a3ad00(0000) GS:ffff9eb43bd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 kernel: CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 kernel: CR2: 0000000000001030 CR3: 00000001122ab000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: Call Trace: kernel: kernel: ? die+0x1f/0x60 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bondipsecaddsaall: failed to add SA kernel: ? pagefaultoops+0x142/0x4c0 kernel: ? douseraddrfault+0x65/0x670 kernel: ? kvmreadandresetapfflags+0x3b/0x50 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: ? excpagefault+0x7b/0x180 kernel: ? asmexcpagefault+0x22/0x30 kernel: ? nsimbpfuninit+0x50/0x50 [netdevsim] kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bondipsecaddsaall: failed to add SA kernel: ? nsimipsecoffloadok+0xc/0x20 [netdevsim] kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): making interface the new active one kernel: bondipsecoffloadok+0x7b/0x90 [bonding] kernel: xfrmoutput+0x61/0x3b0 kernel: bond0: (slave eni0np1): bondipsecaddsaall: failed to add SA kernel: ippushpendingframes+0x56/0x80

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

sctp: Fix null-ptr-deref in reuseportaddsock().

syzbot reported a null-ptr-deref while accessing sk2->skreuseportcb in reuseportaddsock(). [0]

The repro first creates a listener with SOREUSEPORT. Then, it creates another listener on the same port and concurrently closes the first listener.

The second listen() calls reuseportaddsock() with the first listener as sk2, where sk2->skreuseportcb is not expected to be cleared concurrently, but the close() does clear it by reuseportdetachsock().

The problem is SCTP does not properly synchronise reuseportalloc(), reuseportaddsock(), and reuseportdetachsock().

The caller of reuseportalloc() and reuseport{add,detach}sock() must provide synchronisation for sockets that are classified into the same reuseport group.

Otherwise, such sockets form multiple identical reuseport groups, and all groups except one would be silently dead.

1. Two sockets call listen() concurrently 2. No socket in the same group found in sctpephashtable[] 3. Two sockets call reuseportalloc() and form two reuseport groups 4. Only one group hit first in sctprcvlookupendpoint() receives incoming packets

Also, the reported null-ptr-deref could occur.

TCP/UDP guarantees that would not happen by holding the hash bucket lock.

Let's apply the locking strategy to sctphashendpoint() and sctpunhashendpoint().

[0]: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 10230 Comm: syz-executor119 Not tainted 6.10.0-syzkaller-12585-g301927d2d2eb #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/27/2024 RIP: 0010:reuseportaddsock+0x27e/0x5e0 net/core/sockreuseport.c:350 Code: 00 0f b7 5d 00 bf 01 00 00 00 89 de e8 1b a4 ff f7 83 fb 01 0f 85 a3 01 00 00 e8 6d a0 ff f7 49 8d 7e 12 48 89 f8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 28 84 c0 0f 85 4b 02 00 00 41 0f b7 5e 12 49 8d 7e 14 RSP: 0018:ffffc9000b947c98 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 0000000000000002 RBX: ffff8880252ddf98 RCX: ffff888079478000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: 0000000000000012 RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: ffffffff8993e18d R09: 1ffffffff1fef385 R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1fef386 R12: ffff8880252ddac0 R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 00007f24e45b96c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9300000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007ffcced5f7b8 CR3: 00000000241be000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: sctphashendpoint net/sctp/input.c:762 [inline] sctphashendpoint+0x52a/0x600 net/sctp/input.c:790 sctplistenstart net/sctp/socket.c:8570 [inline] sctpinetlisten+0x767/0xa20 net/sctp/socket.c:8625 syslistensocket net/socket.c:1883 [inline] syslisten+0x1b7/0x230 net/socket.c:1894 dosyslisten net/socket.c:1902 [inline] sesyslisten net/socket.c:1900 [inline] x64syslisten+0x5a/0x70 net/socket.c:1900 dosyscallx64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] dosyscall64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entrySYSCALL64afterhwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f24e46039b9 Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 91 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b0 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f24e45b9228 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIGRAX: 0000000000000032 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f24e468e428 RCX: 00007f24e46039b9 RDX: 00007f24e46039b9 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f24e468e420 R08: 00007f24e45b96c0 R09: 00007f24e45b96c0 R10: 00007f24e45b96c0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f24e468e42c R13: ---truncated---

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

memcg: protect concurrent access to memcgroupidr

Commit 73f576c04b94 ("mm: memcontrol: fix cgroup creation failure after many small jobs") decoupled the memcg IDs from the CSS ID space to fix the cgroup creation failures. It introduced IDR to maintain the memcg ID space. The IDR depends on external synchronization mechanisms for modifications. For the memcgroupidr, the idralloc() and idrreplace() happen within css callback and thus are protected through cgroupmutex from concurrent modifications. However idrremove() for memcgroupidr was not protected against concurrency and can be run concurrently for different memcgs when they hit their refcnt to zero. Fix that.

We have been seeing listlru based kernel crashes at a low frequency in our fleet for a long time. These crashes were in different part of listlru code including listlruadd(), listlrudel() and reparenting code. Upon further inspection, it looked like for a given object (dentry and inode), the superblock's listlru didn't have listlruone for the memcg of that object. The initial suspicions were either the object is not allocated through kmemcachealloclru() or somehow memcglistlrualloc() failed to allocate listlruone() for a memcg but returned success. No evidence were found for these cases.

Looking more deeply, we started seeing situations where valid memcg's id is not present in memcgroupidr and in some cases multiple valid memcgs have same id and memcgroupidr is pointing to one of them. So, the most reasonable explanation is that these situations can happen due to race between multiple idrremove() calls or race between idralloc()/idrreplace() and idrremove(). These races are causing multiple memcgs to acquire the same ID and then offlining of one of them would cleanup listlrus on the system for all of them. Later access from other memcgs to the listlru cause crashes due to missing listlruone.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

padata: Fix possible divide-by-0 panic in padatamthelper()

We are hit with a not easily reproducible divide-by-0 panic in padata.c at bootup time.

[ 10.017908] Oops: divide error: 0000 1 PREEMPT SMP NOPTI [ 10.017908] CPU: 26 PID: 2627 Comm: kworker/u1666:1 Not tainted 6.10.0-15.el10.x8664 #1 [ 10.017908] Hardware name: Lenovo ThinkSystem SR950 [7X12CTO1WW]/[7X12CTO1WW], BIOS [PSE140J-2.30] 07/20/2021 [ 10.017908] Workqueue: eventsunbound padatamthelper [ 10.017908] RIP: 0010:padatamthelper+0x39/0xb0 : [ 10.017963] Call Trace: [ 10.017968] [ 10.018004] ? padatamthelper+0x39/0xb0 [ 10.018084] processonework+0x174/0x330 [ 10.018093] workerthread+0x266/0x3a0 [ 10.018111] kthread+0xcf/0x100 [ 10.018124] retfromfork+0x31/0x50 [ 10.018138] retfromforkasm+0x1a/0x30 [ 10.018147]

Looking at the padatamthelper() function, the only way a divide-by-0 panic can happen is when ps->chunksize is 0. The way that chunksize is initialized in padatadomultithreaded(), chunksize can be 0 when the minchunk in the passed-in padatamtjob structure is 0.

Fix this divide-by-0 panic by making sure that chunksize will be at least 1 no matter what the input parameters are.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mlxsw: spectrumaclerp: Fix object nesting warning

ACLs in Spectrum-2 and newer ASICs can reside in the algorithmic TCAM (A-TCAM) or in the ordinary circuit TCAM (C-TCAM). The former can contain more ACLs (i.e., tc filters), but the number of masks in each region (i.e., tc chain) is limited.

In order to mitigate the effects of the above limitation, the device allows filters to share a single mask if their masks only differ in up to 8 consecutive bits. For example, dstip/25 can be represented using dstip/24 with a delta of 1 bit. The C-TCAM does not have a limit on the number of masks being used (and therefore does not support mask aggregation), but can contain a limited number of filters.

The driver uses the "objagg" library to perform the mask aggregation by passing it objects that consist of the filter's mask and whether the filter is to be inserted into the A-TCAM or the C-TCAM since filters in different TCAMs cannot share a mask.

The set of created objects is dependent on the insertion order of the filters and is not necessarily optimal. Therefore, the driver will periodically ask the library to compute a more optimal set ("hints") by looking at all the existing objects.

When the library asks the driver whether two objects can be aggregated the driver only compares the provided masks and ignores the A-TCAM / C-TCAM indication. This is the right thing to do since the goal is to move as many filters as possible to the A-TCAM. The driver also forbids two identical masks from being aggregated since this can only happen if one was intentionally put in the C-TCAM to avoid a conflict in the A-TCAM.

The above can result in the following set of hints:

H1: {mask X, A-TCAM} -> H2: {mask Y, A-TCAM} // X is Y + delta H3: {mask Y, C-TCAM} -> H4: {mask Z, A-TCAM} // Y is Z + delta

After getting the hints from the library the driver will start migrating filters from one region to another while consulting the computed hints and instructing the device to perform a lookup in both regions during the transition.

Assuming a filter with mask X is being migrated into the A-TCAM in the new region, the hints lookup will return H1. Since H2 is the parent of H1, the library will try to find the object associated with it and create it if necessary in which case another hints lookup (recursive) will be performed. This hints lookup for {mask Y, A-TCAM} will either return H2 or H3 since the driver passes the library an object comparison function that ignores the A-TCAM / C-TCAM indication.

This can eventually lead to nested objects which are not supported by the library [1].

Fix by removing the object comparison function from both the driver and the library as the driver was the only user. That way the lookup will only return exact matches.

I do not have a reliable reproducer that can reproduce the issue in a timely manner, but before the fix the issue would reproduce in several minutes and with the fix it does not reproduce in over an hour.

Note that the current usefulness of the hints is limited because they include the C-TCAM indication and represent aggregation that cannot actually happen. This will be addressed in net-next.

[1] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 153 at lib/objagg.c:170 objaggobjparentassign+0xb5/0xd0 Modules linked in: CPU: 0 PID: 153 Comm: kworker/0:18 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc6-custom-g70fbc2c1c38b #42 Hardware name: Mellanox Technologies Ltd. MSN3700C/VMOD0008, BIOS 5.11 10/10/2018 Workqueue: mlxswcore mlxswspacltcamvregionrehashwork RIP: 0010:objaggobjparentassign+0xb5/0xd0 [...] Call Trace: objaggobjget+0x2bb/0x580 objaggobjget+0xe/0x80 mlxswspaclerpmaskget+0xb5/0xf0 mlxswspaclatcamentryadd+0xe8/0x3c0 mlxswspacltcamentrycreate+0x5e/0xa0 mlxswspacltcamvchunkmigrateone+0x16b/0x270 mlxswspacltcamvregionrehashwork+0xbe/0x510 processonework+0x151/0x370

block: initialize integrity buffer to zero before writing it to media

dev/parport: fix the array out-of-bounds risk

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

kobjectuevent: Fix OOB access within zapmodaliasenv()

zapmodaliasenv() wrongly calculates size of memory block to move, so will cause OOB memory access issue if variable MODALIAS is not the last one within its @env parameter, fixed by correcting size to memmove.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tipc: Return non-zero value from tipcudpaddr2str() on error

tipcudpaddr2str() should return non-zero value if the UDP media address is invalid. Otherwise, a buffer overflow access can occur in tipcmediaaddrprintf(). Fix this by returning 1 on an invalid UDP media address.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

USB: serial: mos7840: fix crash on resume

Since commit c49cfa917025 ("USB: serial: use generic method if no alternative is provided in usb serial layer"), USB serial core calls the generic resume implementation when the driver has not provided one.

This can trigger a crash on resume with mos7840 since support for multiple read URBs was added back in 2011. Specifically, both port read URBs are now submitted on resume for open ports, but the context pointer of the second URB is left set to the core rather than mos7840 port structure.

Fix this by implementing dedicated suspend and resume functions for mos7840.

Tested with Delock 87414 USB 2.0 to 4x serial adapter.

[ johan: analyse crash and rewrite commit message; set busy flag on resume; drop bulk-in check; drop unnecessary usbkillurb() ]

gfs2: Fix NULL pointer dereference in gfs2logflush

drm/amdgpu: avoid using null object of framebuffer

drm/i915/gt: Fix potential UAF by revoke of fence registers

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ibmvnic: Add tx check to prevent skb leak

Below is a summary of how the driver stores a reference to an skb during transmit: txbuff[freemap[consumerindex]]->skb = newskb; freemap[consumerindex] = IBMVNICINVALIDMAP; consumerindex ++; Where variable data looks like this: freemap == [4, IBMVNICINVALIDMAP, IBMVNICINVALIDMAP, 0, 3] consumerindex^ txbuff == [skb=null, skb=, skb=, skb=null, skb=null]

The driver has checks to ensure that freemap[consumerindex] pointed to a valid index but there was no check to ensure that this index pointed to an unused/null skb address. So, if, by some chance, our freemap and txbuff lists become out of sync then we were previously risking an skb memory leak. This could then cause tcp congestion control to stop sending packets, eventually leading to ETIMEDOUT.

Therefore, add a conditional to ensure that the skb address is null. If not then warn the user (because this is still a bug that should be patched) and free the old pointer to prevent memleak/tcp problems.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nftables: prefer nftchainvalidate

nftchainvalidate already performs loop detection because a cycle will result in a call stack overflow (ctx->level >= NFTJUMPSTACKSIZE).

It also follows maps via ->validate callback in nftlookup, so there appears no reason to iterate the maps again.

nftablescheckloops() and all its helper functions can be removed. This improves ruleset load time significantly, from 23s down to 12s.

This also fixes a crash bug. Old loop detection code can result in unbounded recursion:

BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at .... Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN CPU: 4 PID: 1539 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5+ #1 [..]

with a suitable ruleset during validation of register stores.

I can't see any actual reason to attempt to check for this from nftvalidateregisterstore(), at this point the transaction is still in progress, so we don't have a full picture of the rule graph.

For nf-next it might make sense to either remove it or make this depend on table->validatestate in case we could catch an error earlier (for improved error reporting to userspace).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: nftables: fully validate NFTDATAVALUE on store to data registers

register store validation for NFTDATAVALUE is conditional, however, the datatype is always either NFTDATAVALUE or NFTDATAVERDICT. This only requires a new helper function to infer the register type from the set datatype so this conditional check can be removed. Otherwise, pointer to chain object can be leaked through the registers.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf

The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumerpos is the consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the data, and producerpos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of data reserved by all producers.

Each time a record is reserved, the producer that "owns" the record will successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.

One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual memory.

Each record has a struct bpfringbufhdr { u32 len; u32 pgoff; } header for book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program. Helpers like bpfringbufreserve() return (void )hdr + BPFRINGBUFHDRSZ for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk's header.

For example, consider the creation of a BPFMAPTYPERINGBUF map with size of 0x4000. Next, the consumerpos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to bpfringbufreserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in [0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets allocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumerpos was edited ahead of time to pass the newprodpos - conspos > rb->mask check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned earlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data pages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A's header. bpfringbufsubmit() / bpfringbufdiscard() use the header's pgoff to then locate the bpfringbuf itself via bpfringbufrestorefromrec(). Once chunk B modified chunk A's header, then bpfringbufcommit() refers to the wrong page and could cause a crash.

Fix it by calculating the oldest pendingpos and check whether the range from the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring buffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We've tested with the ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/runbenchringbufs.sh) before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it is still not significantly enough to matter.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xprtrdma: fix pointer derefs in error cases of rpcrdmaepcreate

If there are failures then we must not leave the non-NULL pointers with the error value, otherwise rpcrdmaepdestroy gets confused and tries free them, resulting in an Oops.

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/i915/dpt: Make DPT object unshrinkable

In some scenarios, the DPT object gets shrunk but the actual framebuffer did not and thus its still there on the DPT's vm->boundlist. Then it tries to rewrite the PTEs via a stale CPU mapping. This causes panic.

[vsyrjala: Add TODO comment] (cherry picked from commit 51064d471c53dcc8eddd2333c3f1c1d9131ba36c)

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ipset: Fix race between namespace cleanup and gc in the list:set type

Lion Ackermann reported that there is a race condition between namespace cleanup in ipset and the garbage collection of the list:set type. The namespace cleanup can destroy the list:set type of sets while the gc of the set type is waiting to run in rcu cleanup. The latter uses data from the destroyed set which thus leads use after free. The patch contains the following parts:

- When destroying all sets, first remove the garbage collectors, then wait if needed and then destroy the sets. - Fix the badly ordered "wait then remove gc" for the destroy a single set case. - Fix the missing rcu locking in the list:set type in the userspace test case. - Use proper RCU list handlings in the list:set type.

The patch depends on c1193d9bbbd3 (netfilter: ipset: Add list flush to cancelgc).

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: prevent possible NULL deref in fib6nhinit()

syzbot reminds us that in6devget() can return NULL.

fib6nhinit() ip6validategw( &idev ) ip6routechecknh( idev ) idev = in6devget(dev); // can be NULL

Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc00000000bc: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN PTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x00000000000005e0-0x00000000000005e7] CPU: 0 PID: 11237 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00249-gbe27b8965297 #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 06/07/2024 RIP: 0010:fib6nhinit+0x640/0x2160 net/ipv6/route.c:3606 Code: 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b 64 24 58 48 8b 44 24 28 4c 8b 74 24 30 48 89 c1 48 89 44 24 28 48 8d 98 e0 05 00 00 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 b3 17 00 00 8b 1b 31 ff 89 de e8 b8 8b RSP: 0018:ffffc900032775a0 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: 00000000000000bc RBX: 00000000000005e0 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: 0000000000000010 RSI: ffffc90003277a54 RDI: ffff88802b3a08d8 RBP: ffffc900032778b0 R08: 00000000000002fc R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 00000000000002fc R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff88802b3a08b8 R13: 1ffff9200064eec8 R14: ffffc90003277a00 R15: dffffc0000000000 FS: 00007f940feb06c0(0000) GS:ffff8880b9400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 0000000000000000 CR3: 00000000245e8000 CR4: 00000000003506f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400 Call Trace: ip6routeinfocreate+0x99e/0x12b0 net/ipv6/route.c:3809 ip6routeadd+0x28/0x160 net/ipv6/route.c:3853 ipv6routeioctl+0x588/0x870 net/ipv6/route.c:4483 inet6ioctl+0x21a/0x280 net/ipv6/afinet6.c:579 sockdoioctl+0x158/0x460 net/socket.c:1222 sockioctl+0x629/0x8e0 net/socket.c:1341 vfsioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline] dosysioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline] sesysioctl+0xfc/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893 dosyscallx64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] dosyscall64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entrySYSCALL64afterhwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f940f07cea9

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ACPICA: Revert "ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine."

Undo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 ("ACPICA: avoid "Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.""). The initial purpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation regions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings if different page attributes are present.

However, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping continues until the boundary's end, but there is still an attempt to read/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer deference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but only one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary's end, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL pointer deference.

Instead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not mandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is permissible for it to be mapped across different regions.