The ImageMagick Engine ImageMagick Engine WordPress plugin before 1.7.11 for WordPress is vulnerable to OS Command Injection via the "clipath" parameter. This allows authenticated attackers, with administrator-level permission to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server leading to remote code execution.

On Sun, Oct 22, 2023 at 09:19:59AM -0500, Bob Friesenhahn wrote: On Sat, 21 Oct 2023, Demi Marie Obenour wrote: For Rocky Linux Security SIG, the only relevant thing mentioned so far was possibly offering an OpenBSD pledge()-alike that other packages could use. However, I am skeptical any actually would, unless we also introduce such uses ourselves and maintain own "override" packages (replacing RHEL rebuild ones or those coming from EPEL, etc.) of such software. Initially, we are going to only create "override' packages for core or very commonly used/exposed components, and to do so only for specific good reasons. So stuff like e.g. ImageMagick/GraphicsMagick coming from EPEL and with most of its dependency libraries coming from AppStream repos, or e.g. GraphViz coming from AppStream, is unlikely to make the cut, at least not initially. Has deprecating ImageMagick and/or GraphicsMagick outright been considered? I don’t just mean the downstream packages, but the entire upstream projects, or at least the libraries. RHEL already deprecated ImageMagick several years ago and advised users to use GraphicsMagick (https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/redhatenterpriselinux/7/html/7.7releasenotes/deprecatedfunctionality). Those users were confused given that many of the recipes they were using for ImageMagick did not work with GraphicsMagick. The solution for those users was to find a different way to install ImageMagick. One option would be to instead make an IPC call to a persistent daemon running in the background. That said, has wasm2c been considered? The best fix would be something that can make C code memory-safe, even if it comes at a performance hit of 4x or more (like SoftBound+CETS did). Stuff that cares about performance should be migrating to something like libvips or ImageFlow.

If neither of these are options, I think the entire library will need to be deprecated for eventual removal. The command-line tools can remain, but they can be much more strongly sandboxed than a library can, because they have the entire process to themselves. Any deprecations or sandboxing approaches which fail to understand and address the needs of the "user" will fail. Replacing package 'A' with package 'B', where package 'B' works totally differently, or performs different functions than package 'A' will fail because the users will not use it. That is true. Unfortunately, most Linux IPC mechanisms are not very secure since they rely on historical Unix privilege models to control access. If one can bypass access control on IPC, one can easily get root by sending malicious commands to systemd, so I don't think this is something to worry about. Common ways to assure security such as TLS usually result in a considerable reduction of performance. Solutions like Landlock seem useful for very restricted usage applications. Sandboxing solutions which work for any use of a program seem better than requiring a client/server model. The advantage of a client/server model is that it avoids a library having to spawn child processes, which was mentioned as a concern earlier. I agree that it is more effort than desirable. As the developer/maintainer of a complex C program (GraphicsMagick), I appreciate any advice on improvements which make it more suitable for sandboxing, or less likely to appear as a hazard on the security radar. To make a program suitable for sandboxing, several requirements must be met:

1. The program must run in a separate address space. This can either be a OS process, a software fault isolation (SFI) container, or a SFI container inside an OS process. If an SFI container is used without a separate OS process, additional care must be taken to prevent side-channel attacks, so I do not recommend this solution without significant additional research.

2. All I/O resources (such as file descriptors) must be acquired before processing untrusted input. It must not be possible to use these resources to access additional resources the program should not have access to.

3. Before processing untrusted input, the program must lose the ability to acquire additional I/O resources.

4. The address space (whether an OS process or an SFI container) must not be reused once processing has completed, unless it can be forcibly and verifiably reset to its initial state.

5. If the inputs to the processing were untrusted, the results must also be considered untrusted.

A command-line tool can probably meet all of these requirements but the last one quite easily. For a library, the difficulty of meeting these requirements will depend significantly on the library API. I am not familiar with the GraphicsMagick API and so am not sure how difficult it will be for the GraphicsMagick API to support sandboxing. -- Sincerely, Demi Marie Obenour (she/her/hers) Invisible Things Lab

An issue was discovered with ImageMagick 7.1.0-4 via Division by zero in function ReadEnhMetaFile of coders/emf.c.

ImageMagick before 6.9.12-91 allows attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) in Magick::Draw.

A heap use after free issue was discovered in ImageMagick's ReplaceXmpValue() function in MagickCore/profile.c. An attacker could pass specially crafted file to convert, triggering an heap-use-after-free write error, allowing an application to crash, resulting in a denial of service.

https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/1061db7f80fdc9ef572ac60b55f408f7bab6e1b0

Hi,

Reading changelog and code of imagemagick, I want to report a stack overflow with crafted tiff file in imagemagick

Fixed (after 6.9.12-26) by: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick6/commit/85a370c79afeb45a97842b0959366af5236e9023

Original reporter was Muhammad Aldo Firmansyah

Thanks

Bastien (rouca)

Shell command injection vulnerability via video:vsync or video:pixel-format options in VIDEO encoding/decoding https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6338

Undefined behaviors of casting double to sizet in svg, mvg and other coders (recurring bugs of CVE-2022-32546) https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/6341

A Heap Buffer Overflow issue in imagemagick, which has been fixed here: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/9a9896fce95d09e5e47b86baccbe1ce1a2fca76b

It was discovered that ImageMagick incorrectly handled certain values. If a user were tricked into processing a specially crafted image file, an attacker could possibly exploit this issue to cause a denial of service or other unspecified impact. (CVE-2022-32545, CVE-2022-32546) It was discovered that ImageMagick incorrectly handled memory under certain circumstances. If a user were tricked into processing a specially crafted image file, an attacker could possibly exploit this issue to cause a denial of service or other unspecified impact. (CVE-2022-32547)

End of life: 12/21/2022, Latest version: 3.20.0

End of life: 12/21/2022, Latest version: 3.20.0

A flaw was found in ImageMagick. The vulnerability occurs due to improper use of open functions and leads to a denial of service. This flaw allows an attacker to crash the system.

A flaw was found in ImageMagick where it did not properly sanitize certain input before using it to invoke convert processes. This flaw allows an attacker to create a specially crafted image that leads to a use-after-free vulnerability when processed by ImageMagick. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to confidentiality, integrity, as well as system availability.

End of life: 8/31/2024, Latest version: 3.18.8

End of life: 8/31/2024, Latest version: 3.18.8

A flaw was found in ImageMagick in MagickCore/quantum-private.h. An attacker who submits a crafted file that is processed by ImageMagick could trigger a heap buffer overflow. This would most likely lead to an impact to application availability, but could potentially lead to an impact to data integrity as well. This flaw affects ImageMagick versions prior to 7.0.9-0.

ImageMagick 7.0.8-68 there is a heap-buffer-overflow at coders/tiff.c in TIFFGetProfiles.

Reference: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/issues/1748

Upstream patch: https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/commit/986b5dff173413fa712db27eb677cdef15f0bab6

A call to ConformPixelInfo() in the SetImageAlphaChannel() routine of /MagickCore/channel.c caused a subsequent heap-use-after-free or heap-buffer-overflow READ when GetPixelRed() or GetPixelBlue() was called. This could occur if an attacker is able to submit a malicious image file to be processed by ImageMagick and could lead to denial of service. It likely would not lead to anything further because the memory is used as pixel data and not e.g. a function pointer. This flaw affects ImageMagick versions prior to 7.0.9-0.

End of life: 11/19/2020, Latest version: 3.16.0

End of life: 11/19/2020, Latest version: 3.16.0

Buffer overflow in the DecodePSDPixels function in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick before 6.8.8-5 might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted PSD image, involving the L%06ld string, a different vulnerability than CVE-2014-2030.

Stack-based buffer overflow in the WritePSDImage function in coders/psd.c in ImageMagick, possibly 6.8.8-5, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a crafted PSD image, involving the L%06ld string, a different vulnerability than CVE-2014-1947.

coders/meta.c in ImageMagick allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (out-of-bounds read) via a crafted file.

In GraphicsMagick 1.4 snapshot-20190403 Q8, there is a use-after-free in ThrowException and ThrowLoggedException of magick/error.c.

In GraphicsMagick 1.4 snapshot-20190423 Q8, there is a heap-based buffer overflow in the function ImportRLEPixels of coders/miff.c.

In GraphicsMagick 1.4 snapshot-20191208 Q8, there is a heap-based buffer over-read in the function EncodeImage of coders/pict.c.

ImageMagick before 7.0.9-0 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service because XMLPARSEHUGE is not properly restricted in coders/svg.c, related to SVG and libxml2.

ImageMagick 7.0.8-34 has a "use of uninitialized value" vulnerability in the WriteJP2Image function in coders/jp2.c.

LocaleLowercase in MagickCore/locale.c in ImageMagick before 7.0.8-32 allows out-of-bounds access, leading to a SIGSEGV.