It was discovered that when dealing with undefined security domains, the org.jboss.security.plugins.mapping.JBossMappingManager implementation would fall back to the default security domain if available. A user with valid credentials in the defined default domain, with a role that is valid in the expected application domain, can perform actions that was otherwise not available to them. When using the SAML2 STS Login Module, JBossMappingManager exposes this issue since PicketLink Trust SecurityActions implementation use a hardcoded default value when defining the context.

A DOM based cross-site scripting flaw was found in the way the administrative console of the JBoss Application Server processed some certain messages (the 'onerror' argument was not sanitized prior further use). A remote attacker could provide a specially-crafted web page and trick the valid JBoss AS user, with the administrator privilege, to visit it, which would lead into the DOM environment modification and arbitrary HTML or web script execution.