A flaw was found in Keylime before 6.3.0. The logic in the Keylime agent for checking for a secure mount can be fooled by previously created unprivileged mounts allowing secrets to be leaked to other processes on the host.

In Keylime before 6.3.0, unsanitized UUIDs can be passed by a rogue agent and can lead to log spoofing on the verifier and registrar.

A vulnerability in Keylime before 6.3.0 allows an attacker to craft a request to the agent that resets the U and V keys as if the agent were being re-added to a verifier. This could lead to a remote code execution.

In Keylime before 6.3.0, quote responses from the agent can contain possibly untrusted ZIP data which can lead to zip bombs.

In Keylime before 6.3.0, Revocation Notifier uses a fixed /tmp path for UNIX domain socket which can allow unprivileged users a method to prohibit keylime operations.

In Keylime before 6.3.0, current keylime installer installs the keylime.conf file, which can contain sensitive data, as world-readable.

A flaw was found in Keylime. Due to added strict type checking, Keylime fails to read data from a database populated by a previous version of Keylime. This flaw allows an attacker to make the service unavailable by populating the database before an update to the affected version. Affected component: Keylime Affected version of Keylime: 7.12.0

Hello Team, please check the below report: --------

Keylime does not enforce that the agent registrar data is the same when the tenant uses it for validation of the EK and identity quote and the verifier for validating the integrity quote.

This allows an attacker to use one AK, EK pair from a real TPM to pass EK validation and give the verifier an AK of a software TPM.

Affects all versions of Keylime <6.4.0

Thanks