For some Iomega, Lenovo, LenovoEMC NAS devices versions 4.1.402.34662 and earlier, the file upload functionality of the Content Explorer application is vulnerable to path traversal. As a result, users can upload files anywhere on the device's operating system as the root user.
For some Iomega, Lenovo, LenovoEMC NAS devices versions 4.1.402.34662 and earlier, when changing the name of a share, an attacker can craft a command injection payload using backtick "" characters in the name parameter. As a result, arbitrary commands may be executed as the root user. The attack requires a value c and iomega parameter.
For some Iomega, Lenovo, LenovoEMC NAS devices versions 4.1.402.34662 and earlier, when changing the name of a share, an attacker can craft a command injection payload using backtick "" characters in the share : name parameter. As a result, arbitrary commands may be executed as the root user. The attack requires a value c and iomega parameter.
For some Iomega, Lenovo, LenovoEMC NAS devices versions 4.1.402.34662 and earlier, when joining a PersonalCloud setup, an attacker can craft a command injection payload using backtick "" characters in the client:password parameter. As a result, arbitrary commands may be executed as the root user. The attack requires a value c and iomega parameter.
Due converting PIO to the new memory read/write api we no longer provide separate I/O region lenghts for read and write operations. As a result, reading from PIT Mode/Command register will end with accessing pit->channels with invalid index and potentially cause memory corruption and/or minor information leak.
A privileged guest user in a guest with QEMU PIT emulation enabled could potentially (tough unlikely) use this flaw to execute arbitrary code on the host with the privileges of the hosting QEMU process. (QEMU part of the vulnerability)
A privileged guest user in a guest could potentially (tough unlikely) use this flaw to execute arbitrary code on the host. (KVM part of the vulnerability)
Acknowledgements:
Red Hat would like to thank Matt Tait of Google's Project Zero security team for reporting this issue.