Where
AND
AND
-Infinity
0
Severity
9.8
Double Free
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net/x25: Fix potential double free of skb

When allocskb fails in x25queuerxframe it calls kfreeskb(skb) at line 48 and returns 1 (error). This error propagates back through the call chain:

x25queuerxframe returns 1 | v x25state3machine receives the return value 1 and takes the else branch at line 278, setting queued=0 and returning 0 | v x25processrxframe returns queued=0 | v x25backlogrcv at line 452 sees queued=0 and calls kfreeskb(skb) again

This would free the same skb twice. Looking at x25backlogrcv:

net/x25/x25in.c:x25backlogrcv() { ... queued = x25processrxframe(sk, skb); ... if (!queued) kfreeskb(skb); }

1 / 3
Source: NVD
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: fix heap overflow in NFSv4.0 LOCK replay cache

The NFSv4.0 replay cache uses a fixed 112-byte inline buffer (rpibuf[NFSD4REPLAYISIZE]) to store encoded operation responses. This size was calculated based on OPEN responses and does not account for LOCK denied responses, which include the conflicting lock owner as a variable-length field up to 1024 bytes (NFS4OPAQUELIMIT).

When a LOCK operation is denied due to a conflict with an existing lock that has a large owner, nfsd4encodeoperation() copies the full encoded response into the undersized replay buffer via readbytesfromxdrbuf() with no bounds check. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds write of up to 944 bytes past the end of the buffer, corrupting adjacent heap memory.

This can be triggered remotely by an unauthenticated attacker with two cooperating NFSv4.0 clients: one sets a lock with a large owner string, then the other requests a conflicting lock to provoke the denial.

We could fix this by increasing NFSD4REPLAYISIZE to allow for a full opaque, but that would increase the size of every stateowner, when most lockowners are not that large.

Instead, fix this by checking the encoded response length against NFSD4REPLAYISIZE before copying into the replay buffer. If the response is too large, set rpbuflen to 0 to skip caching the replay payload. The status is still cached, and the client already received the correct response on the original request.

First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

1 / 4
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )
Severity
9.4
AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H/E:U

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

1 / 4
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

1 / 4
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )
Severity
9.1
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

1 / 4
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Use After Free
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

1 / 5
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
Race Condition
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

1 / 4
Source: Launchpad
First published (updated )
Severity
9.4
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfilter: ip6teui64: reject invalid MAC header for all packets

eui64mt6() derives a modified EUI-64 from the Ethernet source address and compares it with the low 64 bits of the IPv6 source address.

The existing guard only rejects an invalid MAC header when par->fragoff != 0. For packets with par->fragoff == 0, eui64mt6() can still reach ethhdr(skb) even when the MAC header is not valid.

Fix this by removing the par->fragoff != 0 condition so that packets with an invalid MAC header are rejected before accessing ethhdr(skb).

1 / 4
Source: MITRE
First published (updated )
Severity
9.8
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

media: dvb-net: fix OOB access in ULE extension header tables

The ulemandatoryexthandlers[] and uleoptionalexthandlers[] tables in handleoneuleextension() are declared with 255 elements (valid indices 0-254), but the index htype is derived from network-controlled data as (ulesndutype & 0x00FF), giving a range of 0-255. When htype equals 255, an out-of-bounds read occurs on the function pointer table, and the OOB value may be called as a function pointer.

Add a bounds check on htype against the array size before either table is accessed. Out-of-range values now cause the SNDU to be discarded.

First published (updated )
Severity
9
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:H/E:U

hfsplus: fix slab-out-of-bounds in hfsplusbnoderead()

1 / 2
Source: Microsoft
First published (updated )
Severity
10
Buffer Overflow
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

The asn1 implementation in (a) the Linux kernel 2.4 before 2.4.36.6 and 2.6 before 2.6.25.5, as used in the cifs and ipnatsnmpbasic modules; and (b) the gxsnmp package; does not properly validate length values during decoding of ASN.1 BER data, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) or execute arbitrary code via (1) a length greater than the working buffer, which can lead to an unspecified overflow; (2) an oid length of zero, which can lead to an off-by-one error; or (3) an indefinite length for a primitive encoding.

First published (updated )
Severity
9
Buffer Overflow
AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:C

Buffer overflow in SCTP in Linux kernel before 2.6.16.17 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly execute arbitrary code via a malformed HB-ACK chunk.

First published (updated )

Contact

SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
132 Wickham Terrace
Fortitude Valley,
QLD 4006, Australia
info@secalerts.co
By using SecAlerts services, you agree to our services end-user license agreement. This website is safeguarded by reCAPTCHA and governed by the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service. All names, logos, and brands of products are owned by their respective owners, and any usage of these names, logos, and brands for identification purposes only does not imply endorsement. If you possess any content that requires removal, please get in touch with us.
© 2026 SecAlerts Pty Ltd.
ABN: 70 645 966 203, ACN: 645 966 203