Background
NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.
The cryptographic key handling library, nkeys, recently gained support for encryption, not just for signing/authentication. This is used in nats-server 2.10 (Sep 2023) and newer for authentication callouts.
Problem Description
The nkeys library's "xkeys" encryption handling logic mistakenly passed an array by value into an internal function, where the function mutated that buffer to populate the encryption key to use. As a result, all encryption was actually to an all-zeros key.
This affects encryption only, not signing. FIXME: FILL IN IMPACT ON NATS-SERVER AUTH CALLOUT SECURITY.
Affected versions
nkeys Go library: 0.4.0 up to and including 0.4.5 Fixed with nats-io/nkeys: 0.4.6
NATS Server: 2.10.0 up to and including 2.10.3 Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.10.4
Solution
Upgrade the nats-server. For any application handling auth callouts in Go, if using the nkeys library, update the dependency, recompile and deploy that in lockstep.
Credits
Problem reported by Quentin Matillat (GitHub @tinou98).
Background
NATS.io is a high performance open source pub-sub distributed communication technology, built for the cloud, on-premise, IoT, and edge computing.
NATS users exist within accounts, and once using accounts, the old authorization block is not applicable.
Problem Description
Without any authorization rules in the nats-server, users can connect without authentication.
Before nats-server 2.2.0, all authentication and authorization rules for a nats-server lived in an "authorization" block, defining users. With nats-server 2.2.0 all users live inside accounts. When using the authorization block, whose syntax predates this, those users will be placed into the implicit global account, "$G". Users inside accounts go into the newer "accounts" block.
If an "accounts" block is defined, in simple deployment scenarios this is often used only to enable client access to the system account. When the only account added is the system account "$SYS", the nats-server would create an implicit user in "$G" and set it as the noauthuser account, enabling the same "without authentication" logic as without any rules.
This preserved the ability to connect simply, and then add one authenticated login for system access.
But with an "authorization" block, this is wrong. Users exist in the global account, with login rules. And in simple testing, they might still connect fine without administrators seeing that authentication has been disabled.
The blind-spot on our part came from encouraging and documenting a switch to using only "accounts", instead of "authorization".
In the fixed versions, using an "authorization" block will inhibit the implicit creation of a "$G" user and setting it as the noauthuser target. In unfixed versions, just creating a second account, with no users, will also inhibit this behavior.
Affected versions
NATS Server: 2.2.0 up to and including 2.9.22 and 2.10.1 Fixed with nats-io/nats-server: 2.10.2 and backported to 2.9.23
Workarounds
In the "accounts" block, define a second non-system account, leave it empty.
accounts { SYS: { users: [ { user: sysuser, password: makemeasandwich } ] } DUMMY: {} # for security, before 2.10.2 } systemaccount: SYS
Solution
Any one of these:
1. Upgrade the NATS server to at least 2.10.2 (or 2.9.23) 2. Or define a dummy account 3. Or complete the migration of authorization entries to be inside a named account in the "accounts" block
Credits
Problem reported by Alex Herrington. Addressed publicly in a GitHub Discussion prior to this advisory.